Collective Values, Behavioural Norms, and Rules: Building Institutions for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction by Chu, Ke-young
Copyright  Author(s) 2001
* International Monetary Fund
This study is linked to the theme of Growth and Poverty discussed at the WIDER Development Conference,
25-26 May 2001, Helsinki. UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the
governments of Denmark, Finland and Norway to the 2000-2001 research programme.
Discussion Paper No. 2001/98
Collective Values, Behavioural
Norms, and Rules





Economic growth and poverty reduction require for a country to establish efficient rules
for economic and political transactions. Poor countries suffer from inadequate, inefficient
transaction rules. Formal rules (e.g., laws, policies) must be nested in hospitable
behavioural norms and values. Cultural collectivism in many of these countries and
consequent group-oriented values, factionalism, and discretionary rule implementation
have adverse implications for their efforts to establish well-defined property rights and
other rules. Over time, these countries must establish rules for government-enforced,
widespread impersonal transactions. To this end, efficient economic and political
transactions should be promoted as repeated games. Institutional reform efforts should be
aimed at expanding transactions, initially among small, voluntary groups, capitalizing on
economic agents’ group-oriented values for intragroup governance; at entrusting important
rule implementing functions to autonomous, nonpoliticized agencies; and at inducing
competing political groups to align their goals more with societal than factional interests.
Keywords: growth, poverty, rules, institutions, human behaviour
JEL classification: D70, H10, I30, K00, O10, Z10UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) was
established by the United Nations University as its first research and training
centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The purpose of the Institute
is to undertake applied research and policy analysis on structural changes
affecting the developing and transitional economies, to provide a forum for the
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally
sustainable growth, and to promote capacity strengthening and training in the
field of economic and social policy making. Its work is carried out by staff
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by
the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of any of the views
expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-018-4 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-019-2 (internet publication)
Acknowledgements
This is a revised version of a paper I presented at the World Institute for Development
Economics Research (WIDER) conference on growth and poverty (Helsinki, May 25-26,
2001). I am thankful to Matti Kääriäinen, the discussant of my paper, and several other
conference participants for helpful comments. I am also thankful to Sandy Mackenzie,
Luiz de Mello, Ludger Schuknecht, and other colleagues for helpful comments on an
earlier version. This paper expands on a speaking note I used for a seminar held with a
group of visiting economics and public administration graduate students from Ewha
Womans University (Seoul, Korea) at the IMF in August 2000. Views in the paper are
strictly personal, not necessarily those of the IMF.1
1. Introduction
This paper combines the recent contributions of North (and other new institutional
economists) and of Hofstede to suggest issues for consideration in building institutions for
economic growth and poverty reduction in developing (and transition) countries. North
(1990, 1994) has analyzed the role of institutions for economic performances of different
societies through time. Hofstede (1997), who pioneered cross-country values studies, has
analyzed dimensions of culture in different societies and their human behavioural
implications. An integration of these contributions can provide a useful way to look at the
economic growth process and the role of public institutions.
It is obvious that human behaviour influences long-term economic growth and poverty
reduction. While economists distinguish among technical, institutional, and behavioural
relations, behaviour affects both technical and institutional relations and shapes them in the
long run.1 Human behaviour, mainly, is what shapes labour supply, human capital
formation, invention, tax payments, and many other processes that drive, or affect,
economic growth and poverty reduction.
As Simon (1985) has pointed out, nothing is ‘more fundamental in setting our research
agenda … than our view of the nature of the human beings… it [human nature] also makes
a difference for the proper design of political institutions’. However, understanding human
nature, which is universal, is not sufficient; it is also important to understand how human
behavioural norms differ among countries.
A market economy has its superstructure (relations among economic aggregates and
product and factor markets), infrastructure (formal institutions), and foundation (values,
which determine economic agents’ behavioural norms and shape formal institutions).
Economics, as a system of analytical tools, should have its corresponding superstructure
(an integrated macroeconomic and general equilibrium microeconomic framework),
infrastructure (an analytical framework for formal institutions), and foundation (a clearly
specified set of underlying assumptions regarding economic agents’ values).
New institutional economists have criticized neoclassical economists for not paying
attention to what should comprise the infrastructure and proper foundation of economics.2
1 Institutional relations in this context (e.g., tax, government transfer schedules) are narrower in scope than in
North's definition of institutions, discussed later in this paper. A production function—a technical relation—
assumes technical efficiency, a result of optimization, which is a consequence of human behavior. A de facto
tax function—an institutional relation in a narrow sense—depends on tax compliance, an outcome of human
behavior.
2 For example, their questions include the following: Does neglecting transaction costs yield unrealistic
economic models? Is the assumption of human rationality underlying neoclassical economics realistic
particularly for developing countries? Rationality in economics often means that ‘individuals know what is
in their self-interest and act accordingly’. (North, 1994). Economists have since been incorporating
transaction costs into their models and using less stringent assumptions (e.g., bounded rationality and
instrumental rationality).2
They have now made the point that ‘institutions matter’. Moreover, North has stressed that
economists must try to understand how formal institutions can be compatible with informal
norms. In this analytical framework, some empirical studies have related economic growth
to indicators of a rule of law and other institutional efficiency. However, a question
remains: How do different elements of institutions interact, particularly in developing
countries? For example, what are the implications of economic agents’ informal norms
and values for formal institutions?
The objectives of this paper are twofold: (1) to analyze the implications of human
behavioural norms for how formal institutions function and (2) to identify issues for
consideration in building institutions, particularly public institutions, in developing
countries. The paper discusses how beliefs, ideas, and values of individuals and groups
directly or indirectly affect economic growth. While these have crucial implications for
economic growth, economics rarely analyzes them.
The paper's approach is interdisciplinary, drawing on conclusions of the research not only
in economics, but also in history and other social science disciplines. The aim is to suggest
a way to assess the role of values in the process of economic growth, particularly the
implications of collective values of a society for the operation and development of its
economy.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the findings of new
institutional economists regarding the relationship between rules and economic growth.
While drawing on North’s extensive research, it also discusses some of the recent
empirical research. Sections 3 and 4 provide an overview of the findings of recent research
in culture, values, and behaviour and suggest their economic implications. In particular, the
sections highlight the economic implications of cultural collectivism. Sections 5, 6, and 7
draw on historical analysis of the economic implications of rules to identify issues for
consideration in making and implementing rules for growth and poverty reduction in
culturally collectivist societies. Section 8 provides conclusions.
2. Institutions as rules and economic growth
2.1 Institutions as rules of the game
Using a game theory analogy, North (1990, 1994) defines institutions as humanly designed
formal and informal rules of the game for individual and organizational interactions.
Formal rules include a legal system, government regulation, and policy measures; informal
rules include norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct.
Efficient rules promote economic growth. They encourage individuals to engage in
productive activities by providing proper incentives, by establishing a stable structure of
human interactions, and, thus, by reducing uncertainty. They also limit the number of
choices available for individuals and, as a result, limit the cost of comparing alternative
choices.3
3 Buchanan and Young (2001).3
2.2 Process of institutional change
Explaining how institutions evolve is a demanding task that requires an interdisciplinary
approach. It is particularly demanding when institutions are defined as encompassing
informal norms. Drawing on the findings of the recent research in cognitive science, North
has suggested an approach to explaining institutional change. The process of institutional
development, based on North (1990, 1994), and drawing also on Hofstede (1997) and
others, may be sketched as follows:
Beliefs, values, and institutions: Institutional development is a learning process. Human
beings learn by forming mental models upon which they interpret their experiences from
the physical and sociocultural environment in a structured manner.
· Human beings use mental models to engaged in ‘representational redescription (RR)’;
for example, they extract general conclusions from particular experiences and use
analogy. In this manner, they develop beliefs, which help them form their individual
attitudes, values, and ideologies.4
· Shared individual beliefs form collective attitudes, values, and ideologies, which form
a culture. Culture provides members of a group with a means of both reducing the
divergence in individual mental models and transferring unifying perceptions to new
generations. While attitudes, values, and ideologies can promote a rational approach to
problem solving, they also can create myths, dogmas, and prejudices.5
· A culture manifests itself in values (a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs
over others), rituals (collective activities), and symbols (languages and other means of
expression). If a culture were compared to a multilayered sphere, values would form its
innermost core; rituals and symbols its outer layers. Values change only slowly;
symbols, less slowly.6
4 This model of human cognitive development hypothesizes that the RR process separates human learning
process from those of other processors of information and identifies three sources of human knowledge:
innate predispositions, interaction with the environment, and, most importantly, an internal mind-enriching
process of representing and re-representing knowledge; see Clark and Karmiloff-Smith (1993).
5 This is where the views of new institutional economists and some other social scientists diverge from
neoclassical economists. For example, North states: ‘The rational-choice framework ... is patently false in
making choices under ... the conditions that have characterized the political and economic choices that
shaped (and continue to shape) historical change’; see North (1994). Huntington expresses a similar, but
perhaps less definite, view of the rationality assumption: ‘People do not live by reason alone. They cannot
calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self’; see Huntington (1996).
These views are also in line with those of anthropologists. For example, Wilk (1996: 104) notes: ‘Many
economists ... believe that once people acquire moral values, they all use them in the same ... predictable
way. Although values may be culturally relative, they say, logic and rationality are not... Anthropologists
often disagree with economists on this point’.
6 Psychologists distinguish between terminal values (concerning, e.g., equality, freedom, and happiness) and
instrumental values (concerning, e.g., courage, honesty, politeness, and responsibility); see Berry, et al.
(1992: 53).4
· Given their beliefs, human beings develop institutions to structure and order their
interactions.
· Beliefs and institutions thus created are not, in and of themselves, efficient and growth
promoting. The process of institutional development is not necessarily a rational
process of agents' building efficient institutions through the survival of the fittest. A
deterioration in institutional strength in a society does not necessarily trigger its
automatic recovery.7
· Mantazavinos, North, and Shariq (2001) distinguish between individual learning and
shared learning and between two types of shared learning: the static and the
evolutionary. While evolutionary shared learning is central to the development of rules
for a society, the distinction between static and evolutionary shared learning is central
to recognizing what can and cannot change in the short run in designing rules.
Institutional change and institutional entrepreneurs. Institutions evolve as a result of
interactions among rules, organizational or individual agents, and institutional
entrepreneurs.
· Institutional entrepreneurs respond to various exogenous and endogenous signals to
bring about institutional innovations. The signals are not necessarily economic (e.g., a
change in relative prices); individuals’ and groups’ good or bad ideas,a sw e l la svested
interests, matter. Interactions among individuals—institutional entrepreneurs and
political, business, religious, and intellectual leaders8 of small and large groups—are
important.9
· Just as Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs provide leadership in combining capital and new
technology to introduce new products or to operationalize new, more efficient ways to
produce old products, institutional entrepreneurs provide leadership in combining ideas
and political visions to introduce sustainable, more efficient, and practical new rules
(e.g., a new constitution, tax law, and anti-trust legislation). In many cases, they are not
public figures.10 Some are well known (e.g., as discussed later in this paper,
Cleisthenes, James Madison, Lee Kuan Yew).11
7 Arrow (1974: 29), suggesting a similar possibility, points out how inability to break commitments often
gives rise to ‘the greatest tragedies of history, this sense of commitment to a past purpose which reinforces
the original agreement precisely at a time when experience has shown that it must be reversed... The True
Believer is much more effective in social action, but whether it is in the right direction may be another
question’.
8 These are not necessarily mutually exclusive groups.
9 See Lindsay (2000).
10 ‘Institutional entrepreneur’ is the term used by North (1994). An institutional entrepreneur could be a
minister of finance who seeks foreign advice on the design of a tax system, mobilizes political support for the
new system, and institutes a new, efficient, enduring tax regime. An institutional entrepreneur could also be a
treasury department director who starts a new, more efficient, and transparent budget execution system; see
Section VI of this paper for a further discussion. The technology analogy of institutions has useful5
2.3. Stages of development of institutions for economic and political transactions
Through history, a country's transition to a mature market economy has passed through
two stages for both economic and political transactions.12 Transactions without adequate
third-party enforcement. The development of institutions for economic transactions in this
stage takes two phases. In the first phase, intracommunity transactions rely on personal
ties.13 Specialization is minimal, and living standards are low. While primitive societies
engaged in this form of transactions, a breakdown of formal rules has pushed economic
agents in some advanced societies (e.g., Russia) to resort increasingly to personal ties or
similar devices (e.g., business networks). In the second phase, intercommunity transactions
take place with inadequate intercommunity institutions. There can be some formal
institutions governing intracommunity transactions, but no effective institutions for
intercommunity transactions, which are governed by informal ties (e.g., merchant codes of
conduct, exchange of hostages, or rituals). As explained later, the Community
Responsibility System in the medieval Europe, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and
chaebol-bank relations in Korea share some of the features of institutions in this phase of
development.14
Political transactions also can take place without third-party enforcement. Political groups
often engage in competition without a well-defined, tightly enforced legal framework (e.g.,
an effective election law). Politicians often compete within political groups without a
similar formal framework (e.g., an effective charter governing competition for members of
a political party).
Whether economic or political, transactions in this stage take place as essentially a nonco-
operative game. Without an adequate legal framework with third-party enforcement,
organizational and individual agents engage in transactions only if they expect their self-
enforced transactions to bring about more positive payoffs than in conceivable
counterfactual situations.
implications. As Rodrik (1998) notes, market institutions may be compared to a technology that combines a
society’s all available resources, only a part of which is production technology (or transformation, compared
with transaction, technology), to produce goods and services.
11 This characterization of the role of an institutional entrepreneur in no way reduces the importance of the
will of the people in a democratic society. Historians, however, do not hesitate to recognize the special role
of, for example, James Madison by calling him the Father of the US Constitution.
12 The discussion of institutions for economic transaction is based on North (1990). Economic transactions
comprise exchanges between buyers and sellers, between creditors and debtors, and more broadly among
competitors, for example, among competing producers. Political transactions comprise exchanges between
rulers and constituents, between representatives and voters, and among competing political groups, etc. The
discussion here is limited to transactions between sellers/creditors and buyers/debtors and among competing
political groups and individuals. Economic and political games of various kinds proceed simultaneously.
13 A ‘community’ is a group of individuals with personal ties (e.g., kinship, friendship, or acquaintanceship,
etc.).
14 See Greif (1994) for a game theoretic analysis of how individualist values gave rise to formal transaction
institutions among the Genoese.6
Widespread impersonal transactions with third-party enforcement. In this stage, a coercive
government provides efficient institutions for impersonal intracommunity and
intercommunity economic transactions throughout a nation state. A low-cost transaction
system provides opportunities for specialization and efficient production. Institutions in
developed economies have these features. Legal and other rules with third-party
enforcement also govern intergroup and intragroup political transactions. Transactions in
this stage may be compared to playing co-operative games.15
2.4 Game theoretic characterization
Institutional development is a process of agents' learning how to engage in exchanges, or
transactions, with one another.
Nonco-operative games: Nonco-operative game theory characterizes the conditions
underlying institutional development in its initial phase, when there is no adequate third-
party enforcement. Economic agents (i.e., players) engage in exchanges without formal
rules (i.e., play nonco-operative games—games that players play only because playing
their self-enforced games promotes their interests). In the absence of third-party
enforcement, however, conditions for voluntary, impersonal exchanges among a large
number of agents are difficult to achieve.16 Game theory offers two types of models of
these transactions. The first model explains how intracommunity transactions take place
without third-party enforcement. Players engage in exchanges when
· their play is repeated (i.e., they are engaged in a repeated, rather than one-off, game),
· they possess information about other players (i.e., the players’ past performances are
known to all players), and
· the number of players is small.17
A special case is a two-person repeated game with personal enforcement. As far as all
agents' past actions are publicly observable, however, Kandori (1992) has shown that a
limited number of players can engage in exchange repeatedly with changing partners.
The second model explains how intercommunity transactions take place without third-
party enforcement. Kandori (1992) has shown that, such transactions are feasible through
contagious punishments, in which a single member's misbehaviour (e.g., default or other
violation of codes of conduct), triggers a retaliation by opponent players against all
15 Note that a degree of co-operation can play a role in nonco-operative games. For example, members of a
community observe social norms, not because they are forced to observe the norms, but because they expect
to benefit from observing them.
16 North (1990: 14); see Romp (1997), Aumann (1987), and Nasser (1998) for a distinction between a co-
operative game and a nonco-operative game.
17 North (1990: 12). In the context of banking, Greif (1997) has stated these conditions more formally: The
game of exchange is possible if (1) it is repeated infinite number of periods, (2) borrowers have an identity, a
‘label’ that is known to all the lenders, and (3) the history of the game is common knowledge, namely, each
player’s past actions are known to all.7
members of the community to which the misbehaving agent belongs. In this case, trust is
attached to the community as a whole, not to its individual members. Information
requirements for repeated transactions are relatively small. As indicated, the Community
Responsibility System, Grameen Bank, and chaebol system are examples (see Section 5.2
for a discussion).
Co-operative games: The conditions shown by the models of nonco-operative game for
intercommunity transactions without third-party enforcement are demanding ones.
Widespread intercommunity transactions that allow efficient specialization are not feasible
without transactions with third party enforcement. The models of co-operative game show
that an enforceable contract can bring about Pareto-optimal improvement for the players
engaged in a prisoners' dilemma.18
2.5 Efficient rules and economic growth
Only efficient institutions promote growth.19 Affluence in developed countries is a
cumulative result of efficient institutions; poverty in poor countries, of inefficient
institutions. For institutions to function well, formal rules should be securely nested in
hospitable informal norms, which provide legitimacy to them. North (1994) stresses the
role of culture in characterizing informal norms and in reinforcing, or interfering with, the
functioning of formal rules. The slowness with which culture changes, and other linkages
of the present to the past, gives rise to ‘path dependence’. In addition, economic
institutions must be supported by appropriate political institutions.
Rules vs. discretion: To promote productive investments and other activities, rules (e.g.,
laws, regulatory measures, policies, and decrees) should be stable, allowing economic
agents to predict how these rules will affect the returns to their investments. To satisfy this
requirement, rules should be interpreted and implemented objectively and without
discretion, which creates an environment damaging to productive long-term economic
investments.20
Rules and economic growth—empirical studies. Recent research efforts have postulated
and empirically estimated relations between economic growth and measures of institutional
efficiency. For example, the World Economic Forum assesses the economic growth
prospects for each of the more than 50 countries covered in its database by using its
competitiveness index, which reflects the country’s institutional efficiency. This
relationship, estimated by Sachs and Warner (1996), may be presented by
g = f(z, ...)
where
18See, for example, Aumann (1987) or Cooter (2000).
19This definition of efficiency is in line with Posner's two types of efficiency: a rule is substantively
efficient if it ... promotes allocative efficiency; a rule is procedurally efficient if it is designed to reduce the
cost ... of using the system of rules; see Posner (1998).
20In an example used by Arrow (1974), a traffic light, which does not use discretion, is more predictable
than a traffic policeman is; the latter is bound to use personal judgment and, possibly, a degree of discretion.8
g = projected growth rate of a country, and
z = country's institutional efficiency, which is a weighted average of a large number
of measures of how its institutions function.21
In a similar effort, Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998) have postulated that economic
growth is determined by the predictability of rules and a number of other more traditional
factors, including educational attainment, inflation, and trade.22 The predictability of rules
is a composite index of the predictability of rule making, perceived political stability,
security of persons and property, and predictability of judicial enforcement. The estimation
results support the argument that institutional effectiveness promotes growth.
Their equations may be represented by
g = f(r, ...)
where
g = economic growth, and
r = predictability of rules.
2.6. Unresolved questions
While highlighting critical aspects of the role of institutions, these formulations do not
reveal how different elements of institutions, or rules of the game, interact. For example,
they do not reveal how formal and informal rules are related.23 The strength of rules is
simply a composite index of measures of the strength of individual rules. While stressing
the importance of an efficient rule of law for economic growth, they do not suggest why
some countries have been able to establish an effective rule of law, but others have not.24
21 On the basis of cross-country data, Sachs and Warner have estimated an equation that relates economic
growth to competitiveness (reflecting, among other factors, institutional strength), initial income, and other
variables:
gi =f ( z i,y 0i, ...)
where
g= g r o w t h r a t e ,
z = institutional strength,
y0 = initial income, and
i = country subscript.
22 Others (e.g., Barro, 1998) have estimated similar cross-country equations.
23 See Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq (2001) for a discussion of the research agenda in this area.
24 A’rule of law’ here refers to ‘governing by law’; the term ‘rules’ in ‘formal rules’ is used as a contrast to
‘discretion’. As discussed later in this paper, a ‘rule of law’, meaning a ‘rule of rules formulated and
enforced through democratic political processes’, is often compared with a ‘rule of man’, meaning a ‘rule of
discretionary decisions of leaders’.9
3. Collective values and behavioural norms
3.1 Determinants of human behavioural norms
Three levels of uniqueness of human mental programming. Hofstede's (1997) extensive
analysis of the world's cultures offers a useful explanation of why a rule of law prevails in
some countries, but not in others.25 Hosftede notes that there are three levels of
uniqueness in human mental programming: human nature, culture, and personality.
· Human nature is universal and is inherited.26
· Culture is group-specific and is learned. A group can be an extended family, a political
party, or a labour union. It can be the alumni of a university or the residents of a town,
a region, a country, or a group of countries.
· Personality is individual-specific and is both inherited and learned.
Dimensions of culture. Hofstede's approach reduces the study of culture to manageable
proportion by focusing on four quantifiable dimensions of culture. The analysis of these
dimensions suggests channels through which culture affects human behaviour, with regard
to the relations among individuals, between individuals and groups, and among groups and
with regard to their use of rules. The four dimensions of culture are collectivism-
individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. The
analysis in this paper focuses only on the first three as the most relevant to economic
growth:
· Individualism-collectivism (IC) indicates the degree to which individual interests
prevail over collective interests.
· Power distance (PD) indicates the degree to which members of a society expect and
accept that power is distributed unequally.
· Uncertainty avoidance (UA) indicates the degree to which the members of a society
tolerate uncertainty.
3.2 Collective values and general behavioural norms
On the basis of surveys consisting of a series of questions, Hofstede estimates
individualism-collectivism (IC), power distance (PD), and uncertainty avoidance (UA)
indices for 53 countries.27 One of his key findings is that the IC index is closely correlated
25 Hofstede’s pioneering work in the 1980s has inspired a series of extensive research in this area in cross-
cultural psychology; see, for example, Berry, et al. (1992).
26 Note that the term ‘collective values’ refers to shared values of members of a group and is compared with
individual values. The term ‘collectivism’ refers to a group-oriented value system and is used in this paper to
refer to a cultural phenomenon, not a political-economic system (e.g., a system of collectivized production).
Rand (1946) has used the terms, ‘collectivism’ and ‘individualism’, similarly; see Rand (1960), ‘The Soul of
an Individualist’, from Rand (1946).
27 Hofstede (1997). Sociologists and anthropologists have long studied collective values, while psychologists
have studied individual values. Recently, collective values have been identified by aggregating individual10
(negatively) with the PD index, while the UA index is largely independent of both the IC
and PD indices. The countries with an individualist culture tend to have a small PD, while
those with a collectivist culture tend to have a large PD. Hofstede's IC index measures the
degree of individualism in a society—a high index implies a high degree of individualism.
Individualism-collectivism (IC) and power distance (PD). Table 1 contrasts general human
behavioural norms in a collectivist culture (and with a large PD) with those in an
individualist culture (and with a small PD). The table also contrasts general human
behavioural norms associated with strong UA with those associated with weak UA.28 The
IC index suggests general behavioural norms of individuals in relation to their groups. The
behavioural norms indicate that in a collectivist culture (with a large PD),
· members of society tend to value group interests over individual interests and to accept
authoritarian and paternalistic leaders;
· personal ties among members of a group play important roles;
· rule of man, more than rule of law, tends to prevail; discretionary actions, particularly
of those in authority, tends to play an important role; and
· group rivalry and factionalism within a society are pronounced.
By comparison, in an individualist culture (with a small PD), members of a group tend to
value their own interests over group interests and prefer resourceful, democratic leaders.
Those in authority are expected to lead by rules rather than by discretionary, paternalistic
actions.29 The contrast between values in an individualist culture (with a small PD) and a
collectivist culture (with a large PD) is clearly reflected in the following four passages:
Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on justice …
which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. Justice denies that the loss
of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The reasoning
responses to survey questions. Examples of questions to measure individualism-collectivism (IC) indicators
for individuals include the following: (1) If the group is slowing me down, it is better to leave it and work
alone (individualism). (2) To be superior, a man must stand alone (individualism). (3) I enjoy meeting and
talking to my neighbors every day (collectivism). (4) It is reasonable for a son to continue his father's
business (collectivism), etc. (Berry et al, 1992).
28 Note that the indices are national averages; individual indices are distributed around the averages. While
Hofstede (1997) does not provide measures of dispersions that can be used to conduct a test of the statistical
significance of the differences between national averages, the differences between some national averages are
large enough to belong to a same population. The examination of measurement errors and statistical tests of
these estimates, however, will enhance the understanding of the relationship between dimensions of culture
and behavioral norms. Note also that the discussion is on behavioral norms. Actual behavioral patterns may
deviate from these norms. A large difference in behavioral norms between two societies with different
cultural orientation, however, will result in a large difference in actual behavioral patterns.
29 See Barzun (2000: 596-7) for a discussion of how, in the United States, individualist values, competition,
and wealth accumulation were compatible with the growth of nonprofit, nonmarket organizations that
redistributed wealth.11
that balances the gains and losses of different persons as if they were one person is
excluded.30
No creator was prompted by a desire to serve his brothers … His truth was his only
motive. His own truth, and his own work to achieve it in his own way…31
Nation before [ethnic] community and society above self …Regard and community
support for the individual;…Consensus instead of contention …32
If we had to cite a single characteristic of the African culture, the subordination of the
individual by the community would surely be the reference point to remember.
African thought rejects any view of the individual as an autonomous and responsible
being. The African is vertically rooted in his family...; horizontally, he is linked to his
group, to society, to the cosmos...33
The first two statements capture the essence of individualism: primacy of the individual.
The last two statements highlight collectivism and a large PD: group orientation,
paternalistic role of groups for individuals, and emphasis on social cohesion. As discussed
later, however, the emphasis on the interests of the nation as a whole in the official
Singaporean version of collectivist values is not in line with the general reality of a
collectivist culture, where factionalism and group rivalry within a country are a
predominant feature.
Uncertainty avoidance (UA): The UA index indicates the extent to which individuals fear,
and try to avoid, uncertainty. In a culture with strong UA, people have emotional needs for
rules and, therefore, tend to rely on formal rules, even if the rules do not work; their rules
tend to be numerous and precise. By contrast, in a culture with weak UA, individuals tend
to accept uncertainty and have small needs for formal rules.
IC, PD, and UA across countries: Table 2 classifies the sample countries into six groups by
their IC and PD indices. For each country, the table reports the pair of IC and PD indices in
parentheses. A high IC index indicates a high degree of individualism; a high PD index, a
large PD. Hofstede has found a strong statistical correlation between collectivism and a
large PD. In the table, it is clear that, generally, the countries in the western Civilization
tend to have an individualist culture and a small PD. Countries in the rest of the world tend
to have a collectivist culture and a large PD.34
30 Rawls (1990; 24-5). Rawls makes it no secret that his objective is to offer an alternative to utilitarianism,
which he believes is not individualistic (p. 26).
31 Rand (1943).
32 This is the definition of ‘shared values’, in a Government of Singapore white paper, quoted in Huntington
(1996). Huntington notes that the Singaporean government added the phrase ‘regard ... for the individual’ in a
last stage of drafting the paper.
33 Etounga-Manguelle (2000).
34 In Tables 2 and 3 and later in this paper, Hong Kong, SAR refers to Hong Kong, Special Administrative
Region and Taiwan PC refers to Taiwan Province of China.12
Table 1
Dimensions of Culture and General Human Behavioural Norms
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) and Power Distance (PD) Dimensions
Collectivist/Large PD Individualist/Small PD
Interpersonal relationship
Individual identity Based in the social network Based in the individual
Virtues in interpersonal relations Harmony Speaking one’s mind
Relationship and task Relationship over task Task over relationship
Inequalities among people 1/ To be expected and desired To be minimized
Prevailing ideology 1/ Equality over individual freedom Individual freedom over equality
Consequence of trespassing Shame Guilt
Privileges Justified for the powerful Not justified for the powerful
Communication High context Low context
Relationship between individuals and group
Prevailing interest Collective Individual
Societal goals Harmony and consensus Self-actualization
Loyalty to group Strong Weak
Preferred organization Centralization Decentralization
Intergroup relationship
Laws and rights To differ across groups To be the same across groups
Leadership
Ideal boss Benevolent autocrat Resourceful democrat
Guiding value Authoritarian Democratic
State
Role of state Dominant Small
Political power Exercised by interest groups Exercised by voters
Governance Rule of man Rule of law
Discretion Rules
Sources of power Ability to use force Ability to give rewards
Family and friends Formal position
Means of reform Changing top people Changing rules
Prevailing philosophy Hierarchy and stratification Equality
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Dimension
Strong UA Weak UA
Dealing with uncertainty
Uncertainty Feared Tolerated
Rules (and laws) Emotional need for rules, even Minimal need for rules
if they do not work





Source: Compiled from Annex Table 1.
Note: Expecting inequalities among individuals prevails in a culture with a large PD, while the ideology to
prefer equality to individual freedom prevails in an individualist culture. While most individualist values are
compatible with those in a culture with a large PD, these two values are contradictory to some extent. Note,
however, that the prevailing ideology compares equality with individual freedom, not a higher degree of
inequality with a lower degree of inequality.13
Table 2
Country Groups By Individualism-Collectivism (IC) + Power Distance (PD) Indices
Large PD Moderate PD Small PD









































Source: Geert Hofstede (1997).
Note: In parentheses, the first figure indicates individualism; the second PD.14
Table 3
Country Groups by Individualism-Collectivism (IC)
+ Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Indices
Strong UA Moderate UA Weak UA
Individualist United States (91,46)
Australia (90,51)







































Note: In parentheses, the first figure indicates individualism; the second UA.
Belgium and France are the only western developed countries with large PD indices. Costa
Rica is the only country in the rest of the world with both a collectivist culture and a small
PD. Australia, Italy, Spain, Japan, and Argentina are the countries in either the15
individualist or the collectivist camp with a moderate PD. South Africa, Spain, Japan, and
Argentina are moderate with respect to both IC and PD indices.
Table 3 classifies the sample countries by their IC and UA indices. While collectivist
countries tend to have strong UA, individualist countries are scattered over a wide range of
the UA zone. For example, Italy, Belgium, France, and Germany are individualist
countries with strong UA. The United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland have weak
UA.
3.3 Economic implications of cultural collectivism and a large power distance
Cultural collectivism has clear economic implications.
Ambiguous property rights: Group-oriented values can be an obstacle to an effective
system of property rights. They can also be a source of government's discretionary
enforcement of well-defined formal property rights. This can be true between the
government and the private sector, among private groups, and within families.
Governmental discretion discourages efficient transactions and can promote corruption.35
Group rivalry and conflicts: Group orientation can mean intragroup cohesion and
harmony,36 but can also mean intergroup rivalry and conflicts. Effective debates on
economic reform proposals may be facilitated by emphasis on interests of the whole
society over those of different individuals and groups. However, consensus might not be
easy to obtain because of the conflicts among different interest groups, whose respective
members tend to have fierce group loyalties.37
35 The Chinese phrase, ‘eating from one pot’, characterizes economic, social, and political interactions in
many countries both in the Sinic and other civilizations with a collectivist culture.
36 Confucianism formalizes a group-oriented social and political order dominated by wise, paternalistic
leaders. Thus, Confucius' ideals stress personal cultivation as the basis of a world order: ‘Confucianism
traced back the ordering of a national life to the regulation of the family life and the regulation of the family
life to the cultivation of the personal life’; see Lin (1938: 21). In this respect, the ideals of Confucius (551-
479? BC) resemble those of Plato (ca. 427-347 BC), who stressed the role of philosopher-rulers: well-
intentioned aristocrats with trained expertise (Frost, 1962: 182; and Lee, 1987: liii). Unlike in the western
system of government, Confucianism deemphasizes the rule of law. Note that these are ideals; as
individualist societies have deviated in many respects from the ideals of individualism, Confucian societies
have been far from Confucius' idealized world. It appears that Confucian societies, and more broadly
culturally collectivist societies, continue to stress unduly the importance of the roles of wise leaders; this is in
contrast to the tradition of skepticism about such roles in the western world. For example, Madison has
stated: ‘It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests [of
different groups], and render them all subservient to the public goods. Enlightened statesmen will not always
be at the helm’; see Madison (1787). This is an effective argument for a rule of law and against a rule of man.
37 The strength of group loyalty would tend to aggravate the conflicts of different groups' interests.16
Possible unfairness: Attachment to personal ties can mean low costs for intracommunity
transactions, but implies a limited opportunity for intercommunity transactions.38 It can
also mean discrimination against nonmembers in hiring, promoting, issuing licenses,
granting tax exemptions, and allocating public resources. These practices inevitably lead to
unfairness and allocative inefficiency.
Governmental paternalism. A large PD in a collectivist culture implies a tendency of
governmental paternalism. Paternalistic government under wise leadership can correct
some market failures. Misguided paternalism, however, can discourage individual
initiatives and promote allocative distortions. Paternalism justifies governmental intrusion
into personal activities of individuals; it also gives rise to public expectations of
paternalistic government intrusion.39 Here are a few examples from Korea, a culturally
collectivist country with a large PD.40
· The government promoted industrialization through directed lending, tax incentives,
and other administrative support. ‘The state masterminded the early import-
substitution projects in cement, fertilizers, oil refining, and synthetic fibers... The
government also kept alive some unprofitable factories inherited from the colonial
period...’41
· Ju-young Chung, the founder of the Hyundai Group in Korea started building ships at
the suggestion of the government. His autobiography vividly describes how President
Park cajoled, and almost forced, a hesitant Chung to start shipbuilding.42
· At the beginning of the financial crisis, a number of top businessmen advocated a way
out of the crisis through a massive export drive to be supported by the government.43
A direct governmental push for private entrepreneurs to commit to large investment
projects inevitably create expectations of a possible future bailout. Therefore, investors
tend to discount investment risks. The discounting of risks then leads them to excessive
investments supported by government directed bank loans, excess production capacity in
38 Akerlof has noted the role of informational asymmetry in observing similar phenomena (e.g., Hong Kong
village shopkeepers’ extension of credits to regular customers (Akerlof, 1984).
39 Group orientation, while often associated with Asian societies, is a broader phenomenon reflecting
cultural collectivism.
40 Focusing on long-term issues, this paper characterizes the Korean government's policies in the recent 30-
40 years. The Korean government has been pursuing a wide range of economic reform. Some of the policies
described in this paper have been abandoned or modified. Some others will change as a result of the




43 The explanation of government controls (e.g., inefficient price controls, regulations, and tax incentives), if
based on a standard framework assuming individualism, would stress the role of rent seeking by government
officials as an underlying factor. The analysis in this paper would point to government paternalism and
group-orientation that may play a leading or reinforcing role.17
certain sectors, low business profitability, and an accumulation of bad loans for the banks
that have loaned to them.44
Other implications: Members of a culturally collectivist society tend to be less keen to
search for truths that might damage personal ties. Avoiding truths that may damage
personal ties can mean social harmony, but can also mean a suppression of painful truths.
Innovations, scientific discoveries, and rational solutions to social problems may be
elusive. Their behaviour tends to be driven more by shame than by guilt, which tends to be
a prevailing emotion in individualist societies. Shame is a social, while guilt individual,
emotion. In comparison with guilt-driven societies, shame-driven societies will have higher
law enforcement costs, including for detecting tax evasion.
Collectivism can damage competitive processes by creating a sense of community among
competing firms. This sense of community can give rise to collusion among competing
firms. In his autobiography, Chung (1998: 371-2) mentions an episode of an apparent
collusion that took place during an early stage of industrialization in Korea. The owners of
several construction companies in Korea were negotiating among themselves over who
should win a major construction project. Chung uses this episode to stress that Korean
business firms were collegial, not viciously competitive.
4. Values and rules
4.1 Cultural collectivism, a rule of man, and discretionary rule implementation
Scholars have studied the rises and declines of world civilizations through history. They
group contemporary nations into several civilizations. Relying on this grouping,
Huntington (1996) has analyzed the political interactions among seven civilizations:
African, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, and western. On this basis,
Huntington argues that the western Civilization is unique, with several characteristics:
Christianity, a well-established system of property rights, a rule of law, individualism,
rationalism, and the Greek and Roman legacy.
Hofstede's research highlights that cultural collectivism and a large power distance provide
an environment for a rule of man, which justifies discretion in interpreting and
implementing rules. By contrast, countries with an individualist culture tend to have a rule
of law. In the former, personal authority plays a critical role; in the latter, laws play a
critical role. To pursue reform, the former have to change people in authority; the latter
have to change laws. For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to contrast the two broad
country groups:
44 Perkins notes a blurring of the line between the spheres of government and business, arising not from
government paternalism, but from personal ties: ‘Where personal ties between government officials and
businessmen were based on family and family-like relationships (e.g., school ties, origin in the same town or
province), the line between the sphere of government and the sphere of business was gotten blurred…’
(Perkins, 2000: 129)18
· The prosperous economies are those with efficient institutions, in particular, sound
rules, including a rule of law. These are mostly the economies in the western
Civilization, with a high degree of individualism and a small PD. Only a few
economies outside the western Civilization have achieved comparable wealth and
soundness in their institutions.
· Most developing and poor economies belong to a world of cultural collectivism.
While poor countries suffer from low human and physical capital, they also suffer from
weak, inefficient institutions. Human capital formation can expand economic opportunities
for the poor, but institutional change often is crucial for human capital formation. Even in
the presence of high-quality human capital, weak institutions can damage growth
prospects.
If culture influences the effectiveness of rules that govern a society, how strong is the
statistical evidence? The following section offers the results of statistical tests on rules and
dimensions of culture.
Table 4
Dimensions of Culture and Effectiveness of Rules















Mean 48.0 64.5 5.3 3.6 3.7
SD 25.6 24.3 1.1 0.7 1.1
Range 12-91 8-112 2.8-6.7 2.2-5.2 2.4-6.1
High
index =
individualism large strong effective small small
PD UA rules burden evasion
Western 20-22 70 37 60 6.2 3.7 4.0
Rest of
the world
21-25 25 72 71 4.0 3.1 2.8
Sources: Hofstede (1997) and World Economic Forum (2000).
Note: The number of countries used for the averages vary across country groups and indicators. See Annex
Table 2 for details.
4.2. Aspects of rules and dimensions of culture: an illustrative cross-country analysis
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results of a statistical analysis that combines databases from
two separate sources: Hofstede's measures of national individualism-collectivism (IC),
power distance (PD), and uncertainty avoidance (UA) indices and the World Economic
Forum's measures of three national indices of the effectiveness of rules: the effectiveness
of the rule of law (represented by a composite index of the indices for judiciary
independence, soundness of property rights, and independence of the legal framework),19
efficiency of government regulation, and tax evasion.45 The estimation is based on a
sample of 42 countries for which data are available from both sources.
Overview—the west and the rest of the world: Table 4 provides an overview of the
averages for two country groups: the countries that belong to the western Civilization and
the rest of the world. The first three columns report the average IC, PD, and UA indices for
the two country groups; the second three columns report the average indicators of the rule
of law, burden of regulation, and tax evasion. On average, the west, by comparison with
the rest of the world, has an individualist culture with a high IC index (a higher index
indicating a higher degree of individualism) (70 vs. 25) and a small PD index (37 vs. 72).
The west tends to have a smaller UA index than the rest (60 vs. 71).
The west, clearly, has a higher rule of law index than the rest (6.2 vs. 4.0). These results
are consistent with a smaller burden of regulation (3.7 vs. 3.1, a smaller index meaning a
higher burden) and less tax evasion (4.0 vs. 2.8, a higher index meaning less tax evasion).
By comparison with the large difference between the rule of law and tax evasion indices
for the two country groups, the difference between the burden of regulation indices is not
large. To understand this phenomenon, it is not enough to compare the average indices for
the two groups. Rather, it is necessary to take into account other possible factors that affect
the burden of regulation.
For example, it is necessary to note that the western countries tend to have an elaborate
regulatory regime aimed at product safety, antitrust, environmental protection, and other
objectives. Similarly, the observed difference between the tax evasion indices mask an
even larger problem implied for widespread tax evasion in the rest of the world. The
western countries, compared with the rest, have a high statutory tax burden, which tends to
encourage tax evasion. Considering these circumstances, the difference in the tax evasion
indices between the two country groups is considerable. The western countries suffer from
less tax evasion than the rest of the world, although they have higher statutory tax rates.
The regressions reported below further support this conclusion.
Rule of law: Equation (A) postulates that the rule of law (r) is a function of individualism
(i).
(A) r = f(i)
On the basis of Hofstede's analysis, countries with a high individualism index should tend
to have a high rule of law index. Table 5 reports the results of regressions that postulate
that the three indicators of the effectiveness of rules are explained by some of the
dimensions of culture. Alternative functional forms yield statistically significant coefficient
estimates with a right sign. Individualism ‘explains’ the rule of law with a large t-ratio for
the coefficient and an adjusted R-square exceeding 0.500.46 Regulatory burden and tax
45Note that the IC, PD, and UA indices change only slowly, and it is unnecessary to update these indices
annually for statistical analysis.
46The estimation results are robust: Using each of the three components (i.e., for judiciary independence,
soundness of property rights, and independence of the legal framework), rather than the composite rule-of-
law index, as the dependent variable still gives strong statistical results.20
compliance: Equations (B) and (C), respectively, relate the regulatory burden and tax
compliance to cultural factors.
(B) b = g(u, r)
= g(u, f(i))
(C) e = h(r, t)
= h(f(i), t)
Equation (B) postulates that the burden of regulation (b) is a function of UA (u) and the
rule of law (r). Countries with a high degree of UA would tend to have a complicated
regulatory regime; however, if they have an effective rule of law, they would tend to limit
the burden of regulation.
The countries with no effective rule of law would tend to use governmental discretion,
which would increase the regulatory burden. If the rule of law is a function of
individualism, Equation (B) will have a reduced form, in which the burden of regulation
would be a function of UA and individualism.
Equation (C) postulates that tax evasion is a function of the rule of law (r) and statutory tax
rates, represented by an average statutory tax rate (t). An effective rule of law would help a
country reduce tax evasion. However, other things being equal, high statutory tax rates
would encourage tax evasion. Equation (C) also has a reduced form, in which tax evasion
is a function of individualism and statutory tax rates. The results for the functional forms
(3) of Equations (B) and (C) are not as strong as for Equation (A). However, there is a
considerable evidence that certain dimensions of culture influence the effectiveness of
rules.
Test for a sample of collectivist countries: One might ask: Do these results simply reflect
the difference between the west and the rest? The countries in the west have a high degree
of individualism and an effective rule of law. Therefore, the results merely confirm these
obvious facts. Are the relationships postulated in Equations (A), (B), and (C) statistically
valid for a sample of collectivist countries?47
Table 6 reports the results of regressions conducted only for 21 culturally collectivist
countries (i.e., countries with an IC index less than 50). The results are not qualitatively
different from those based on the whole sample.48 A conclusion is that, among collectivist
countries, those with a less collectivist tendency, or a more individualist tendency, have a
47 Like western countries, non-western countries have a varying degree of individualism. For example, Japan
is more individualistic, or less collectivist, than many other collectivist countries. While it is unclear how
quickly a society can become more individualistic, Japan began to adopt some elements of the western
culture following the Meiji Restoration in the nineteenth century; see Hane (1986).
48 Equation (A) has been estimated with and without a dummy for Hong Kong, SAR and Singapore.
Hofstede's indices were estimated when Hong Kong, SAR was still under the British rule. Singapore, which
will be analyzed later in this paper, is one of the few exceptional countries with a collectivist culture and an
e f f e c t i v er u l eo fl a w .21
better performance in maintaining a rule of law than those with a more collectivist
tendency.
Table 5
Dimensions of Culture and Behaviour of Economic Agents













Central tendencies Mean 48.0 64.5 5.3 21.7
of explanatory SD 25.6 24.3 1.1 7.0












(1) 3.6 0.7 2.2-5.2 2.200 0.259 0.165
high index = small burden (4.76) (3.02)
(2) 4.301 -0.011 0.147
(15.57) (-2.84)
(3) 3.069 -0.008 0.188 0.209
(4.64) (-1.79) (2.04)
Tax evasion (1) 3.7 1.1 2.4-6.1 4.608 -0.043 0.050
high index=small evasion (8.38) (-1.78)
(2) 0.328 0.635 0.399
(0.51) (5.31)
(3) 1.328 0.710 -0.064 0.429
(2.15) (6.74) (-3.80)
Sources: Regressions based on data from World Economic Forum (2000) and Hofstede (1997).
Note: The two numbers reported for each explanatory variable and each equation are the estimated coefficient
and associated t-ratio (in parentheses).
Reverse causation? One might also ask: Does causation run in the reverse direction?
Rather than individualism's leading to a rule of law and economic growth, does economic
prosperity provide a society with resources to build a rule of law? Do economic growth
and urbanization reduce group cohesion and lead to individualism? This possibility seems
remote. There are prosperous countries that are culturally collectivist. Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and some other oil-rich countries are prosperous and culturally collectivist. Korea;
Hong Kong, SAR; Singapore; and Taiwan PC are all prosperous countries or regions that
are culturally collectivist.22
Table 6

























































































































































tendencies Mean 26.2 71.3 4.5 18.7
of explanatory SD 11.3 26.3 0.9 5.9





Rule of law (1) 4.5 0.9 2.8-6.1 3.707 0.029 0.096
high index = (8.13) (1.80)
effective rules (2) 3.413 0.034 1.793 0.447
(9.35) (2.68) (3.70)
Burden of (1) 3.5 0.8 2.2-5.2 1.440 0.461 0.243
regulation (1.91) (2.78)
high index = (2) 4.372 -0.012 0.139
small burden (9.84) (-2.10)
(3) 2.386 -0.009 0.385 0.291
(2.50) (-1.54) (2.30)
Tax evasion (1) 3.3 1.1 1.9-6.1 5.152 -0.100 0.241
high index = (7.33) (-2.77)
small evasion (2) -0.134 0.767 0.325
(-0.13) (3.33)
(3) 1.866 0.638 -0.076 0.457
(1.49) (2.99) (-2.42)
Sources: Regressions based on data from World Economic Forum (2000) and Hofstede (1997).
Note: The two numbers reported for each explanatory variable and each equation are the estimated coefficient
and associated t-ratio (in parentheses).
More fundamentally, there is evidence that the emergence of individualism in the west
preceded economic growth. Symptoms of individualism in the west emerged as early as in
ancient Greece and biblical times:
Men began to question the older blind loyalty to the powers of the state, and many
began to assert their own independence and their right to a life more or less free from
the dominance of the established government. Individualism was in the air. Some
suggested that man23
should divorce himself from the authority of the group ... The Sophists ... led this
advance into individualism...49
... a recent general survey of historical and philosophical writing of individualism
concedes that some of the roots lie deep in classical and biblical times and also in
medieval mysticism ...50
This intellectual development, however, did not become a widespread belief. While
scholars are not precise on when individualism emerged, the general acceptance of
individualist values in countries in the western Civilization had to wait for centuries, but
not until industrialization. Anthropologist Macfarlane's (1987) research has indicated that
English society had manifestations of individualism even in the thirteenth century.
... in general it [a recent general survey of historical and philosophical writing of
individualism] stresses the Renaissance, Reformation and the Enlightenment as the
period of great transition. Many of the strands of political, religious, ethical,
economic, and other types of individualism are traced to Hobbes, Luther, Calvin and
other post-1500 writers. Yet, if the present thesis is correct, individualism in
economic and social life is much older than this in England... Individualism, however
defined, predates sixteenth century changes and can be said to shape them all.51
4.3. Questions
This paper has argued that individualist and collectivist values have different behavioural
implications. Group-oriented behaviour has its roots in collectivist values. These values
allow members of a culturally collectivist community to engage in transactions without
formal transaction institutions. Collective sanctions are effective for members of a
culturally collectivist community. Research in game theory, however, raises important
questions. Some game theorists (e.g., Kandori) have advanced models based on mutual and
contagious sanctions to explain these behavioural patterns for agents with individualist
values. Some others (e.g., Greif) have noted that, through history, collectivist and
individualist societies have developed different institutions. For example, through history,
it is individualist societies that have developed formal institutions.
Do people in collectivist societies not care about them as individuals? Isn’t it human
nature, as assumed in many economic models, that human beings seek self-interests?
While they do, it is clear that individualism and collectivism have different behavioural
implications. This paper argues that, even if human beings by nature tend to seek self-
interests, cultural values, which human beings acquire through learning, can dictate human
49 Frost (1962: 179).
50 Mcfarlane (1987: 196).
51 Mcfarlane (1987: 196). Greif (1994) also indicates that individualism characterized social norms of the
medieval Genoa.24
beings in different societies to behave differently.52 Group-oriented values shape human
behaviour in all human societies, but particularly in collectivist societies. Individuals in
culturally collectivist societies, while being guided by group-oriented values, clearly have
varying degrees of tendencies to seek self-interests. Their behaviour may also be
constrained by societal values that stress the importance of group interests.
There are other questions. How have some of the culturally collectivist countries, without
effective rules, achieved growth? Hong Kong, SAR; Japan, and Singapore are among the
world's wealthiest countries and regions. Korea and Taiwan PC are less prosperous, but
have achieved impressive growth records. China, Thailand, Malaysia, and other countries,
all with culturally collectivist values, also have achieved sustained growth. These countries
are all culturally collectivist. These are not simple questions to answer, but one should
point out that growth is a multidimensional phenomenon. What this paper is highlighting is
the implications of (1) rules for growth and (2) values for rules. There are factors other
than rules that affect growth, and there are factors other than values that affect rules. Rules
matter for growth, but they are not all the factors that matter for growth. Values matter for
rules, but they are not all the factors that matter for rules. While a rule of law and rule-
based transactions are critical for growth, so are human capital, high savings, and work
efforts. These countries' rules—at least some of them—must have been more efficient,
transparent, and stable than those in less prosperous countries.
It is also obvious that many of these countries face challenging institutional reform tasks.
Without successfully meeting these challenges, they may not continue to enjoy sustained
growth. If a rule of law is essential for sustained economic growth, but is not readily
achievable in a collectivist culture, and if culture changes only gradually, is it hopeless for
poor countries to achieve long-term economic growth and poverty reduction? Indeed,
there are some reasons why the prospects are not good. North is among those who share
this pessimism:
There is no guarantee that the beliefs and institutions that evolve through time will
produce economic growth... Throughout most of history and for most societies in the
past and present, economic performance has been anything but satisfactory...
Moreover, the radical improvement in economic performance, even when narrowly
defined ... is a modern phenomenon of the last few centuries and confined until the
last few decades to a small part of the world.53
Some have argued that culture should be changed. For example, Etounga-Manguelle
(2000) advocates a ‘cultural revolution’ in education, politics, economics, and social life.
In Japan, a Prime Minister's Commission (2000: 1-2) notes: ‘... we [Japanese] cultivated
ethical norms extolling social and organizational harmony. Socioeconomic affluence and
internationalization, however, made it difficult to sustain such ethical norms unchanged...
How can the power of individuals be better utilized? ... Here we outline two essential
changes. One is to change the methods and systems whereby citizens interact with
52 Experiments with games have shown that human actions even in the west often are backward looking and
adaptive, not strictly rational egoists (see Mueller, 2000).
53 North (1994).25
society... The other essential change is ... promoting individuality and individual
initiatives... ‘
One might argue that, with the process of globalization, cross-country cultural diffusion
might lead to increasingly individualist tendencies in the developing world. However, it is
not revolution, but evolution, that transforms culture, particularly the values that comprise
its innermost core.54 Moreover, it is unclear whether culturally collectivist societies will
accept even a gradual transformation to individualist values. Therefore, it becomes
essential to explore the following questions:
· How do developing countries with a collectivist culture cope with inadequate
institutions to promote growth and poverty reduction?
· How do they build a rule of law, and a system of rules, rather than of discretion, while
still remaining collectivist in their cultural orientation?
· In particular, how do they build public institutions that can overcome group rivalry and
factionalism in their culture?
5. Coping with inadequate transaction institutions for growth and poverty
reduction
5.1 Developing countries—institutional reality
Developing countries must go through a long process of institutional development.
Establishing sound formal institutions takes time. It requires technical expertise, as well as
political will and social consensus; some institutions (e.g., a lower rate tax system, an
expanded social protection programme) may require financial resources.
While developing countries can import formal institutions from developed countries
relatively quickly, intercultural transplantations of informal norms take much longer, even
when developing countries are willing to receive such transplantations.55 Perhaps, in the
long run, this is the most difficult problem facing developing countries in establishing an
economy based on rules and promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. The
54 Psychologists' and historians' research indicates that cultural diffusion is very slow. Psychologists often
distinguish between two types of cultural diffusion: enculturation (cultural diffusion between generations
within a culture) and acculturation (cultural diffusion between cultures). Whether individual or social,
acculturation is a slow process; see Berry, et al. (1992). In the framework of psychologists' model of enforced
changes in behavior, new formal or informal rules would change human behavior through compliance,
identification, and internalization. Internalization of alien rules will take longer than identification, which
takes longer than compliance. Cultural diffusion would not be complete, however, without internalization;
see Lieberman (1956).
55 As Rodrik (1998) points out, acquiring or building institutions may be compared to adopting a new
technology. Institutional technology is specific to local conditions and contains a high degree of ‘tacitness’,
leaving imported blueprints incomplete.26
western industrial countries have developed their formal and informal institutions over
several hundred years.56
5.2 Coping with inadequate transaction institutions—examples
Through history, societies have responded to institutional needs in a variety of ways with
various degrees of success:
Endogenous networks. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, many former Soviet
Union countries, without effective market institutions, saw an emergence of business
networks. The transactions among members of a network, however, are essentially
intracommunity in nature, even if the partners are located geographically wide apart.57
Intracommunity enforcement for intercommunity transactions. The following independent
episodes have common features:
· During the Commercial Revolution, traders in European communities were engaged in
intercommunity trade, without formal intercommunity institutions, by relying on the
Community Responsibilities System (CRS). For example, merchants in Genoa or
Venice traded with merchants in Constantinople or London without a legal contract
enforcement system governing their transactions and without knowing them
personally. The system was reasonably effective. Under the system, a failure to honour
contracts with a member of a community by a member of another community
mobilized latter community's collective sanctions against all members of the former.58
· During the nineteenth century in China, Shanxi bankers expanded their lending to
borrowers in distant places by holding family members of the borrowers collectively
liable. Defaulting borrowers became nonentities within their families. Family members
often were held hostage.59
· The microcredit programme pioneered by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the
chaebol-bank relationship in Korea share similar characteristics (see below).
It is not strictly right to characterize the CRS, Grameen Bank, and chaebol-bank relations
equally as responses to a failure in intercommunity transaction institutions. Clearly, the
CRS functioned with no intercommunity institutions. The operations of the Grameen Bank
and chaebol groups are governed by the respective legal systems of Bangladesh and Korea.
56 North (1973) documents in detail how market institutions in Europe gradually emerged centuries before
the Industrial Revolution.
57 For discussion of endogenous business networks, see Kali (1999). Li (2000) distinguishes between
‘relation-based governance’ and ‘rule-based governance’.
58 Greif (1997); see also Greif (1994), who associates collective punishments more generally with a
collectivist culture. Greif’s analysis also shows that some medieval communities were more collectivist,
while others more individualist, in their cultural orientation and that the collectivist transaction institutions
were more efficient in supporting intracommunity transactions, requiring less costly formal institutions, but
less efficient for intercommunity transactions (Greif, 1994: 942).
59 See Perkins (2000: 234-5). Clearly, as Perkins points out, the Confucian family values helped the system
to function effectively. However, the system has been widespread throughout non-Confucian societies.27
The successful loan management record of the Grameen Bank, however, has been
attributed more to its policy to require borrowers to be jointly liable than to an effective
legal system. The chaebol-bank relations in Korea is subject to a multitude of laws in
Korea; however, there is a general agreement that commercial banking requires major
reform, which is now a key challenge facing Korea.
5.3 Grameen Bank and the chaebol system—institutional dimensions
In spite of their apparent differences, the Grameen Bank’s loan programme and the
chaebol-bank relations share remarkable similarities. These institutions allowed
intercommunity financial transactions to take place without adequate formal
intercommunity institutions governing the transactions. Both institutions have features of a
repeated game—between the Grameen Bank and each borrower group and between a
chaebol group and a bank.
Grameen Bank: In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank has successfully instituted a micro-
financing programme by introducing groups of rural villagers to credits, step by step,
through a learning process in a repeated borrowing-and-repaying game, in which members
of a group provided one another with ‘peer support in the form of mutual assistance and
advice’ and ‘discipline’.60 The Grameen Bank has relied on an interesting mix of
punishments, threats of punishments, and incentives, as well as of traditional and modern
institutional approaches. For example, while relying on intracommunity personal ties and
discipline of borrowers for loan collection, the bank has rotated loan officers
geographically throughout the country to prevent them from developing personal ties with
borrowers.61
Chaebol system: A chaebol group is a collection of large and small, legally separate,
vertically and horizontally linked corporations managed by a mix of professional and
owner executives controlled by an owner-family, usually headed by a paternalistic
chairman. Many chaebol groups have their own marketing channels for some of their
products. A chaebol group's influence extends to a large number of small subcontractors
and suppliers, which often have exclusive business relations with the group.62 The
emergence of the chaebol system cannot be explained without paying attention to the role
of institutions, including informal norms. From institutional perspectives, this system is an
outcome of inadequate transaction institutions and cultural collectivism.
60 Yunus (1999).
61 Yunus (1999) stresses the importance of ‘the power of peers… If one member fails to repay a loan, all
members risk having their line of credits suspended or reduced’. Borrowers are required to join the bank in
self-formed, five-member groups. ‘… a new group submits loan proposals from two members, each requiring
between $25 and $100. After these two borrowers successfully repay their first five weekly installments, the
next two group members become eligible to apply for their own loans. Once they make five repayments, the
final member of the group may apply. After 50 installments have been repaid, a borrower pays her interest,
which is slightly above the commercial rate. The borrower is now eligible to apply for a larger loan’.
Apparently, the Bank used threats of collective punishments, but these threats have rarely been carried out;
see Dowla (2000).
62 See Amsden (1989: 184-8) for a discussion of the close and exclusive ties between the Hyundai Motor
Company and some of its legally separate subcontractors.28
· To an extent, chaebol groups were the means for Korean entrepreneurs to overcome
the weakness of the Korean financial system.63 Banks loaned to chaebol firms partly
because the banks and chaebol groups developed an understanding that the firms
belonging to a chaebol group were collectively liable for all individual loans to them.
Collective liability was ensured through a number of means, including cross
guarantees and chaebol chairmen’s de facto authority over intra-chaebol financial
transactions.64 It is possible that these and other advantages in accessing bank loans
outweighed the inefficiency arising from excessive diversification and inadequate
specialization. A paternalistic government supported the emergence of these relations.
· Chaebol groups benefit from a vertical integration, through ownership and de facto
control of marketing channels, suppliers, and subcontractors. In an economy with
inadequate transaction institutions, internalizing transactions can reduce transaction
costs for chaebol groups.65
· The emergence and operation of chaebol groups cannot be fully explained without
discussing the role of cultural collectivism and a large power distance (PD). Chaebol
chairmen tend to manage their groups in a paternalistic, group-oriented manner. Intra-
chaebol transactions tend to be discretionary and not necessarily governed by market
principles. When the chairman of a chaebol group decides to transfer financial
resources from one corporation to another in the group, the property rights of the small
stockholders of the first corporation are violated. Owner-founders tend to hand over
not only the ownership, but also the management of their corporations, some of which
operate globally, to their sons, not necessarily through a vigorous competition to
choose the best managers. Clearly, dynastic management transfers for large
corporations are an inefficient practice.
5.4 Limitations of intracommunity enforcement mechanisms
The Community Responsibility System could not support a broad expansion of trade. As
the size of communities increased, the system began to face a number of difficulties (e.g.,
the ease of falsification of community affiliation and adverse selection, insufficient
incentives for lenders to examine the creditworthiness of individual borrowers).66
Eventually, the system disintegrated as nation states emerged to provide effective
63 Since the financial crisis Korea experienced in 1977-78, the chaebol system has been undergoing changes,
partly as a result of the Korean government’s effort to reform banking and corporate financing and
governance.
64 Amsden (1989).
65 For a chaebol group, vertical integration gives rise to a mix of forces: It increases the costs of internal
governance. It might give the benefit of economies of scale. It also reduces the costs of market transactions.
The cost of market transactions is higher when product specificity increases. For a given degree of product
specificity, weak transaction institutions in Korea elevated the costs of market transactions, relative to the
costs of internal governance; see Williamson (1985) for a discussion of the efficiency of hierarchical
transactions relative to market transactions in driving vertical integration and of the relationship between the
costs of internal governance and market transactions.
66 Greif (1997).29
intercommunity transaction institutions. The Grameen Bank experience would not be
effective in urban areas with weak personal ties between residents. In an earlier stage, the
chaebol system served useful functions for Korea's drive for growth. The system, however,
is now considered an obstacle for Korea's further economic development. Korea's further
growth depends on whether Korea will develop sound economy-wide institutions that
promote low-cost transactions.
5.5 Lessons for promoting poverty reduction in developing countries
The poor, who are potential entrepreneurs and workers, in developing countries suffer from
not only limited education and skills, but also a lack of access to banks, markets for their
products, inputs for their production, and employment opportunities. Consider the
following hypothetical, but realistic, cases:
· A small farmer needs to buy an equipment, but has to pay for it in cash, which may not
be available until his next crop is harvested and sold.
· A skilled village artisan is unable to borrow money from a local bank to open a small
shop because she does not have a collateral.
· A shopkeeper in a small town wants to hire a part-time helper. While several qualified
candidates are available, she does not know any one of them well enough.
In these examples, critical constraints to growth and poverty reduction are ineffective
transaction institutions. More generally, producers can rarely expand production and
employment without engaging in exchange separated over time and space between the quid
and the quo. Such an expansion, however, inevitably gives rise to an increase in the needs
to extend or access credits.
Building transaction institutions as a repeated game: Grameen Bank experiences suggest
for developing countries an approach to helping the poor establish access to credits,
markets, and inputs in the absence of efficient transaction institutions, including an
effective legal system, that govern borrowing and lending. In line with what game theory
suggests, governments' policy should focus on providing a framework for producers to
form small voluntary groups, such as co-operatives. This framework should be aimed at
(1) building a system of transactions as a repeated game and (2) promoting a system in
which players (e.g., co-operatives, their present and potential creditors) have easy access to
information on the performances of co-operatives, not necessarily of their individual
members. The co-operatives, or co-operative-like groups, would not necessarily have a
formal internal governance structure; their internal governance would be based on personal
ties for co-operation, competition, and mutual sanctions. The size of a group, therefore,
should be small. It would take time for large groups and formal intragroup governance
systems to be established:
· The financial institutions should gradually increase the amounts of loans.
· Producers (e.g., smallholders) should be able to increase their access to financial
institutions by forming groups (e.g., credit co-operatives) each comprising a small
number of producers who are collectively liable for the credits extended to them.
These co-operatives also can organize their efforts to sell their products and to buy
inputs.30
· The members of each co-operative can maintain its credit standings through mutual
sanctions based on members' personal ties.
· These schemes would be applicable, to some extent, to small shopkeepers and
independent entrepreneurs in urban areas. An important point is that groups should be
formed voluntarily among those who have personal ties.67
· As an insurance against employee misconduct on jobs dealing with cash or
merchandise, some employers may demand a ‘collateral’ from impoverished job
seekers whom they do not know. Virtual impossibility for job seekers to satisfy this
requirement may result in failure for an employment contract to materialize. The
employer would either have to find a relative or cancel an expansion. Employees' or
job seekers’ small voluntary co-operatives or co-operative-like organizations, based on
personal ties, could help poor workers secure such jobs.68
Using business groups for large-scale investments. Without the benefits of efficient
institutions for intercommunity transactions, chaebol groups in Korea mobilized financial
resources for large-scale investment projects by relying on informal arrangements that
have proven useful throughout history. Other developing counties may not have choices
other than using a similar system for large-scale investments. Yet the chaebol system is
considered to have been, and to continue to be, inefficient. An effort to use a similar
system should be complemented by an incentive system to minimize its inefficiency. A
collectivist culture justified paternalistic chaebol chairmen to use nonmarket intra-chaebol
transactions and also led a paternalistic government to use directed lending to chaebol
groups to expand investments in the sectors the government wanted to promote. Cross-
guarantees provided banks with incentives to lend to chaebol groups rather than to more
efficient smaller firms. Chaebol groups’ excessive borrowing and high debt-equity ratios
made them financially vulnerable. Chaebol groups would not achieve full efficiency unless
they became specialized. Without efficient transaction institutions, however, chaebol
groups would not be easily broken up. The collectivist culture in Korea will change only
gradually. The government's effort to transform chaebol groups into more efficient sets of
independent corporations should be supported by efforts to build up rule-based transaction
institutions.
6 Issues for building public institutions
Formal economic and political institutions in the western developed economies have
evolved over centuries. Underlying this evolution has been informal norms, supported by
western values. The key features (e.g., individualism, rule of law, rationalism, and well-
established property rights) that Huntington has noted as uniquely associated with the
western Civilization are not unrelated among themselves. The findings reported in this
paper suggest that the western rule of law and a system of property rights depend, among
67 In an urban area, where intercommunity mobility is extensive, it would be challenging, but not impossible,
for interested individuals to form small, voluntary groups that would play this role.
68 Potential employee's inability to offer a collateral often leads to no transaction. Effective institutions
would invigorate transactions in labor markets.31
other factors, on individualism. Rationalism, at least as defined in economics, has its roots
in individualism.
Cultural collectivism, a large power distance, importance attached to personal ties, and
paternalism can have major implications for the functioning of formal economic and
political institutions. Discretion, rather than rules, in the private and public spheres, can
adversely affect entrepreneurs’ investment decisions. Group-orientation can affect the
nature of economic and political competition.
Formal institutions in developing countries should be designed with a full recognition of
how they will interact with collective values. To this end, it is not enough to take into
account human nature, which is universal. It is necessary to take into account dimensions
of a country’s culture in which the formal institutions would be set up. Therefore,
institutional challenges for developing countries in this regard are twofold: (1) How do
governments design and adopt efficient rules? (2) How do governments implement the
rules? The remainder of this paper addresses these questions in reverse order, focusing on
several issues that need to be considered in building formal institutions for economies with
a collectivist culture. Some of these issues do not emerge in economies with an
individualist culture. The paper highlights issues and offer historical examples, but not a
blue print for reform.
6.1 Rule making vs. rule implementing, collectivism, and factionalism
Both rule making and rule implementing are demanding tasks.69 Many culturally
collectivist countries have inadequate rules that need to be reformed. In a collectivist
culture, however, the adoption of efficient rules does not necessarily guarantee their
nondiscretionary implementation. Group rivalry and factionalism in a collectivist culture
can be particularly damaging not only to making sound rules, but also to their proper
implementation. De jure political and economic rules deviate from their de facto
counterparts. It is much more difficult to monitor de facto rules than their de jure
counterparts, particularly when rule implementation is not transparent.
The organization of a well-functioning government is based on at least two principles:
(1) separation of powers and (2) checks and balances. A system of checks and balances
forces the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to be interdependent.70 This system
is designed to separate law making functions from law-implementing functions. If laws
were the only rules, this system also would help separate rule making functions from rule
implementing functions. This formal system functions well when nested in a culture of
individualism.
69 In this section, rules refer to formal rules, unless otherwise indicated.
70 Some writers have distinguished between two conceptions of freedom: (1) the English idea emphasizing
impartial administration of laws through the separation of powers between law making and law implementing
and (2) the American idea emphasizing checks and balances, particularly constraints imposed on law making
by the judiciary; see la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, and Shleifer (2001). This paper, however,
stresses (1) the similarities among the western systems of a rule of law and (2) the discrepancy between de
facto and de jure legal institutions.32
6.2 Checks and balances in a collectivist culture
In a collectivist culture, this system may not function as intended:
· Hofstede's findings imply that those who implement rules in a culturally collectivist
country tend to use discretion more than those in a culturally individualist country do.
Members of different government branches can have loyalty arising more from party
membership, school-ties, or regional affiliation rather than from their official duties.
This loyalty weakens checks and balances intended in the separation-of-powers
principle. In a collectivist culture, a large threat to nondiscretionary rule
implementation often comes from the political party in power. A collectivist culture
can insist that party members put party loyalty above checks and balances intended for
the functioning of government agencies in the separation-of-powers principle.71 This
is particularly true when political parties are formed less for shared interests in
common policy agenda than through personal ties around leading political figures.
· Rule implementation is also undermined by the fact that many functions of the
executive branch often mix rule making and rule implementing. For example, around
the world, finance ministries not only formulate rules (e.g., tax policy, budget, and
regulatory measures), but also often implement them. While a separate tax
administration agency exists in many countries, the head of the agency often reports to
the finance minister. Without a strong tradition of a rule of law and without a
transparent system of the public monitoring of rule implementation, reasonably
efficient rules that have been formulated with public scrutiny may be implemented
through a series of nontransparent, discretionary actions. The results are discrepancies
between de jure and de facto tax, regulatory, and other regimes of economic rules.
How do culturally collectivist societies build a tradition of nondiscretionary rule
implementation? The present governmental organization in the western world works
reasonably well because the formal system of checks and balances is nested in
hospitable values rooted in individualism. The government structure in a culturally
collectivist society may have to be different.
6.3. Issues in institutional reform for nondiscretionary rule implementation
To ensure nondiscretionary rule implementation, the relationship of rule implementing
agencies may have to be redefined vis-à-vis their rule making counterparts. The following
are several questions that should be considered.
Is it feasible to separate rule making and rule implementing functions? Clearly, it would
not be easy to separate all rule making and rule implementing functions into two mutually
exclusive groups. A system of rules encompasses numerous subsystems of rules. It seems
feasible, however to isolate a set of critical rule implementing functions. Here are only a
few examples:
71 Public choice theory suggests that an independent civil service can make it difficult for an elected
government to pursue promised policies; see, for example, Tullock (1987). In countries with a collectivist
culture, however, an excessive loyalty of bureaucrats to elected politicians can be a source of discretion in
rule implementation.33
· Many countries have the office of government prosecutors, mandated with law
enforcement. This function can be separated from not only law making, but also law
enforcement policy formulation.
· Tax administration can be separated from tax policy formulation and legislation; many
countries have a tax administration agency as an agency separate from the ministry of
finance, which has a tax policy department.
· It is feasible to separate agencies that implement regulatory measures (e.g., antitrust,
banking supervision) from those that formulate them and send them to the legislative
branch.
· Budget execution can be separated from budget formation; many countries have a
treasury, which is devoted to budget execution, as an agency separate from a budget
department, which prepares budget proposals for the legislative branch.
It is crucial for a rule making agency to co-ordinate and co-operate their work with the
agency that implements the rules; its appears not essential, however, for them to be a same
agency. Is it desirable? If the principle of separation of powers is applied to making and
implementing rules defined to include not only laws, but also policies, regulations, and
decrees, there is a case for institutionally separating the two types of functions. In a society
with a collectivist culture and a large power distance, prosecutors may be unduly loyal to
those who appoint them.72 This would misguide their law enforcement. One way to reduce
this possibility would be to make those who implement them autonomous vis-à-vis elected
officials, but subject to strict performance standards and checks and balances aimed at
limiting the chance of their abuse of authority.73 Autonomous agencies would have a
greater chance of resisting the political pressure to use their discretion in their
administration of a regulatory, tax, or budget policy regime. In a culturally collectivist
country, such agencies would have a greater chance, than those headed by officials
reporting to political appointees do, to maintain the political neutrality and impartiality of
rule implementation. Separating rule making from rule implementing has received
attention both in countries with an individualist culture and in those with a collectivist
culture. Here are some examples of institutions based on this principle:
Many countries have an independent civil service. The United States introduced the Civil
Service Commission, now the Office of Personnel Management, in 1883 to replace the
‘spoils system’ with a ‘merit system’.
New Zealand's public expenditure management system is based on separating the role of
ministers, who are responsible for policy making, from the role of departmental chief
72 In a society with a strong tradition of a rule of law, a prevailing norm requires that the prosecutors resist
the political pressure of elected officials (e.g., the minister of justice, prime minister, or president) who
appoint them.
73 The judicial independence is based on this principle. In the United States, federal judges are appointed for
a lifetime tenure and cannot be removed from office without an impeachment and conviction. In culturally
collectivist countries, however, judicial independence might not be sufficient for efficient law enforcement.
Even in such an individualist countries as the Unites States, there are views stressing strict constructionism
over judicial activism to ensure the integrity of law enforcement.34
executives, who are in charge of policy implementation. Ministers specify performance
requirements for chief executives to provide clearly specified services to the public. Unlike
the proposal in this paper to make rule implementing functions autonomous, chief
executives in New Zealand report to ministers. The nonpolitical nature of chief executive
positions, however, is illustrated by New Zealand's willingness to hire chief executives
from abroad.74 In this example, elected rule making officials hold appointed rule
implementing officials accountable through performance contracts. The ministers are held
accountable to the prime minister and to the parliament. This system would not work well
in a collectivist culture, in which rule makers are a source of discretionary rule
implementation.
In Brazil's new programme budget system, a programme manager, who is in charge of
implementing a budgeted programme, does not report to the line ministers who supervise
programme activities and control the budgetary resources that are used as inputs for the
programme. Brazil is a collectivist country. This system, in part, adds a layer of checks and
balances, in the process of budget execution, in addition to the one provided by
parliamentary oversight.
Individualist societies try to ensure the political neutrality of some rule implementing
agencies (e.g., an independent judiciary, an autonomous tax collection agency, a
professional civil service).75 Culturally collectivist societies require a more rigorously
designed system of autonomy for rule implementing agencies. These societies require
autonomous rule implementing agencies in areas for which such agencies are not required
in individualist societies. For example, judiciary independence may not be sufficient; an
autonomous unit of prosecutors might be necessary for nondiscretionary law enforcement.
How can local rule implementation be nondiscretionary? In a collectivist culture, local
government operations may be easily influenced by local interest groups with personal ties
74 Scott (1996).
75 The regulatory agencies in the United States are intended to be independent of the political goals of a
particular president, and the heads of many regulatory agencies cannot be removed from office by the
president unless for breaking the law. Some governments entrust an autonomous central bank to conduct,
with a considerable degree of autonomy, monetary policy aimed at price stability. The goal is to strengthen
rule-based macroeconomic policy (i.e., without political interference), although the arrangement allows the
central bank to conduct discretionary monetary policy; see Elster (1994). For example, the central banks
(e.g., the Federal Reserve Bank in the Unites States) are mandated to use discretionary monetary policy to
achieve price stability. The data in legal institutions reported in la Porta, et al. (2001) indicate that many
developing countries, which often do not have a firmly established rule of law, have a legal system based on
a lifelong tenure of supreme court justices, suggesting that formal rules ensuring a lifelong tenure of law-
implementing officials may not be a sufficient condition for a rule of law. It is notable, however, that
virtually all western countries have a system of a lifelong tenure of supreme court justices. It is also notable
that the findings of la Porta, et al. (2001) suggest that both English and American ideas of freedom, when
instituted effectively, are important guarantees of freedom and that the differences between them are not
conclusive.35
to local government officials.76 While local political processes, in principle, should dictate
local policy formulation, should local policy implementation in key areas be assigned to
professional administrators independent of local political interests and without personal
ties to local interest groups? Should such professional administrators belong to the central
government, subject to appropriate checks and balanced vis-à-vis local political
authorities?77 These are relevant issues to consider in designing a system of local rule
implementation.
How can autonomous rule implementing agencies be held accountable? There is no easy
answer to this question. Clearly, autonomous rule implementing agencies can abuse their
authority. It is not easy to determine the degree to which they should be independent.
Should they be independent of ministers, of the prime minister, or even of the president?
This question cannot be answered generally. Different countries would have different
circumstances. In general, cultural collectivism may require a separate layer of checks and
balances. A right question to ask is whether the possibility of their abuse of authority is
relatively more tolerable than the elected officials' abuse of rule implementing agencies'
loyalty for their own political gains.
6.4. Making new rules to tame factionalism: three historical episodes
Rule implementing should be politically neutral, but rule making should be subjected to
political competition. Rules should be an outcome of such competition. Public choice
theory views political competition as an exchange process in which promises of political
services are traded with votes. The theoretical and empirical findings of research in this
area have suggested many problems of political processes: (1) impossibility to translate
individual values to collective preferences; (2) constituents' lack of interest in voting and in
informing themselves of general issues, and (3) politicians' tendency to seek re-election
chances and to pursue populist actions that are not necessarily well-founded.78
Through history, building political institutions has challenged many societies.79 As Nevins
(1956) has noted: ‘From the beginnings of parliamentary government in western Europe
one common weakness appeared on which many nascent legislatures foundered. Almost all
the various assemblies of estates were formed of self-armed aristocratic groups, quite as
jealous of their rights and privileges as of their duties. This was true of England, Scotland,
France, Castile, Scandinavia, and later Prussia. The constituent groups naturally regarded
their representatives as so many attorneys to protect their interests..’. In countries with a
collectivist culture, rivalry among political groups and factions has been, and continues to
76 This system would be in line with the Grameen Bank’s policy to rotate loan officers throughout the
country regularly to prevent them from developing personal ties with local borrowers.
77 In some countries, it is not unusual for the central tax administration agency to collect local taxes on
behalf of local governments.
78 See Tullock (1987).
79 See North (1998) for a discussion of how competition among , as well as within, evolving nation states
determined the features of economic development. Competition among states forced some of the crowns to
trade rights and privileges; see also North (1973).36
be, a critical additional obstacle to establishing a system of orderly, productive political
competition.
The success stories discussed below, however, indicate that it is not uncommon for
politicians to defy the parochial interests of their constituents for broader public welfare. In
these stories, stable frameworks for political competition have emerged from the interplay
of not only vested interests, but also ideas of both groups and individuals. In these stories,
new political institutions have effectively helped a society tame factionalism and
encouraged competing groups to put the interests of the entire society above those of
groups. Individuals, as well as groups, have played key roles in helping a society establish
effective political institutions. The following cases illustrate how three countries softened
factional rivalry through political reform.80 The new institutions helped the countries
achieve sustained economic growth. Institutional entrepreneurs were involved in the design
of the constitutions.81
Cleisthenes’ constitution for ancient Athens.82 In 682 BC, Athens abandoned monarchy
and adopted a government of elected officials (archons), but had serious economic, social,
and political problems—most of all, strife among tribes, between low-income groups and
wealthy aristocrats, and among regions. In spite of Solon’s reform, including debt
cancellations, Athens fell into the hands of tyrants. Some of these tyrants pursued land
reform and other populist policies, but could not resolve deep-rooted factionalism and
economic stagnation. In 510 BC, Athens turned to Cleisthenes, the head of a prominent
family, to lead a constitutional reform effort. Cleisthenes designed and implemented a
constitution that established a new system of political competition.
The constitution required all men 18 years or older to belong to one of the villages
(demes), which numbered about 170 throughout Attica; divided Attica into three regions,
which had a common agricultural basis, but represented Attica’s divergent interests:
handicrafts, fishing, and timber; organized each of the three regions into 10 groups or
thirds (trittyes) in such a manner that the demes of a single group were not necessarily
contiguous pieces of land, thus creating 30 groups in Attica; formed 10 new artificial tribes
(phyle) by drawing by lot three groups from each region; and formed a council of 500
representatives.
80 In present day standards, the systems were not without problems. For example, the Cleisthenes
Constitution accepted slavery, excluded many from citizenship, and did not allow women to participate in the
political process. It is notable that human knowledge and values, which provided ancient Athens with a basis
for the Cleisthenes reform, still supported slavery and kept it for more than 2,000 years—through the
Constitutional Convention and the Civil War in the United States. North stresses that ideas mattered in the
abolition of slavery; see North (1990: 85). The recent series of financial crises around the world indicate that
countries that have an advanced technology and human resources that enabled them to produce sophisticated
electronics and other manufactures can still be institutionally too fragile to prevent a financial crisis.
81 A conventional term would be ‘statesmen’. While Schumpeter's entrepreneurs largely seek profits,
institutional entrepreneurs do not seek profits.
82 This summary is based on Mueller (2001) and Hammond (1986).37
The constitution removed from the political process a source of tribal or other group
rivalry. Thus, the reform ‘transformed Attica from a country of squabbling clans and
geographic and economic interests with a political system that was preoccupied with zero-
sum redistribution, into the world’s first democracy’.83 When accepted, the 500
Councillors took the oath ‘to advise what is best for the state’.84 The several decades
following the institution of the reform include the Athenian Golden Age.
James Madison and the US Constitution: Following the Declaration of Independence, the
13 American colonies clashed over regional and sectoral interests. Some, such as
Hamilton, advocated a strong federal government and a promotion of manufacturing;
others, such as Jefferson, strong states and a promotion of agriculture. Madison’s role was
critical in framing the US Constitution, including the crucial Bill of Rights. A guiding
principle was to protect the constitutional process from factional influences. North stresses
this aspect: ‘Thus Madison, in Federalist Paper Number 10, maintained that the
constitutional structure was devised in 1787 not only to facilitate certain kinds of
exchange, but also to raise the costs of those kinds of exchange that promote the interests
of factions’.85 Madison's role was not limited to mediating between warring political
rivals; he analyzed the constitutional experiences of ancient and modern confederacies and
made specific proposals to craft a constitution without similar shortcomings.86
Lee Kuan Yew and housing and electoral reforms in Singapore. Singapore transformed
itself in mere 35 years from a poor third world economy to a highly competitive, wealthy
modern, rule-based economy. When Singapore became independent, few believed in its
viability as a country.87 Singapore is a culturally collectivist country, where Chinese,
Malays, Indians, and other smaller ethnic groups comprise a diverse population. Racial
strife was not uncommon. Establishing a rule-based economic system without abandoning
a collectivist culture has been an important achievement.
Singapore's success story, while fascinating, is a puzzle with regard to the institutional
issues raised in this paper. The questions are complex: Is Singapore an exception to a rule-
based economy's requiring individualism? Alternatively, has Singapore’s emphasis on
national interests over those of groups within the country succeeded in creating a culture
that mimics individualism and led to a rule-based economic system? Lee has stressed the
importance of Singaporean businesses abiding by ‘the rules of the game’ in ‘an open,
transparent … level playing field’.88
83 Mueller (2001).
84 Hammond (1986: 190).
85 North (1990: 47); see also Mueller (2001) for a similar view.
86 Madison personally went through the books he had asked Jefferson to send him from Paris. Brookhiser
(1996).
87 Lee (2000). Lee shared this pessimism: ‘We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a
body (Lee, 2000: 3).
88 Lee’s interview with Forbes (1998). In the interview, Lee also stresses that cronyism and corruption are ‘a
debasement of Confucianist values. Confucianist duty to family and loyalty to friends should be discharged
from private, not public, wealth’.38
The following institutional reforms are notable. Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew,
the government actively pursued policies to help Singaporeans put the interests of the
nation above those of ethnic groups.89 The government also instituted a housing policy
aimed at promoting ethnically integrated neighbourhoods. To discourage one ethnic group
from occupying an entire apartment building, the government imposed a quota for each
ethnic group in each building in new apartment complexes. While helping Singapore
achieve racially integrated neighbourhoods, however, this housing policy made it virtually
impossible in Parliamentary and local elections for non-Chinese political candidates to
defeat Chinese candidates customarily supported by collectivist-oriented Chinese majority
voters. To ensure that minority groups are represented in the Parliament, the government
instituted a system of group representation constituencies (GRCs), which were created by
amalgamating three or four single-member constituencies and then contested by candidate
groups each with three or four members. Each group of candidates had to include a
minority candidate to receive support of minority voters.90 In this example, formal rules
were designed specifically to limit the problems arising from informal norms—ethnic
groups’ preference to vote for candidates of their own ethnicity.
6.5 Role of institutional entrepreneurs and values
Role of institutional entrepreneurs. The three examples highlight the importance of
ensuring that political competition promote the interests of the society as a whole, rather
than interests of groups, factions, regions, or sectors. To this end, the three countries
adopted formal rules: a new constitution in ancient Athens and the United States and a new
election law in Singapore. In all three countries, institutional entrepreneurs played key
roles.
How did these institutional entrepreneurs emerge? This is not an easy question to answer.
It appears, however, that in all three countries, political and social conditions allowed open
competition, although the openness was not unlimited. Leaders were chosen from the elite,
but there was, to an extent, a relatively level playing field for them to compete. In ancient
Athens, some 80 years prior to the Cleisthenes Constitution, Solon's reform had
established, in what Aristotle called a mixed oligarchic-democratic system, an equality of
political rights among all Athenians, regardless of birth and wealth, in the election of
officials, although voters almost always chose aristocrats for leadership.91 The American
colonies also had a level playing field for political competition. The Founding Fathers in
America, while most of them had had the best formal education available, were not ‘like
89 Lee (2000).
90 Lee (2000: 206-10)
91 Hammond (1986: 162, 190). Greek historians have described the openness of political competition in
ancient Athens around that century. For example, Book II of Thucydides includes ‘The Funeral Oration of
Pericles’, which, delivered about 80 years after the Cleisthenes reform, includes the following passage: ‘... If
we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing,
advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere
with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way—if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the
obscurity of his condition’; see Finley (1959: 267).39
anything that existed in England or Europe’.92 Singapore has been a competitive, merit-
based society.93
Role of values. Values also played a role. In a culturally collective Singapore, the
government has intervened with paternalistic policy measures (e.g., a residential quota
system aimed at racial integration, electoral reform, and a government white paper
stressing the value of national social cohesion). In the west, the functioning of formal
institutions has been reinforced by political values that sought a balance between
respecting the will of the majority and resisting ‘the tyranny of the majority...’.94 These
values have guided many politicians who, ‘in behalf of principle and to defend the overall
interest of the country, confronted the passion of ... a majority of the general public’.95
Madison supported the Constitution, even if his support meant antagonizing Virginians,
who were strong supporters of states' rights, and losing his bid for the first US Senate seat
for Virginia. In the history of the western Civilization, Cleisthenes and Madison have not
been isolated examples of politicians who stood against factionalism. This philosophy has
had it roots in individualism, which values individual preferences, views, and convictions.
The analytical framework positing politicians' behaviour aimed at maximizing re-election
chances or other self-interests cannot fully explain the working of either a well-functioning
democracy or an emerging democracy rooted in a collectivist culture. As Keynes (1936)
has stated: ‘Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
92 Ellis (2000: 11) ‘All of its members, not just those like Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton with
famously impoverished origins, would have languished in obscurity in England or France’.
93 Lee (2000: 59) describes how the Economic Development Board (EDB) selected its senior officials: ‘For
the first few months, the EDB had experts from the UNDP and the International Labor Office to help it...
Hon Sui Sen was picked by Keng Swee as the first chairman ... and given the choice of the brightest and best
of our scholars who had returned from universities in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These
young men were inspired by Sui Sen, a quiet, outstanding administrator with an amazing ability to get the
best out of those who worked for him’. In a number of speeches and interviews, Lee has stressed how he tries
to nurture fair and open competition in Singapore.
94 Mill (1859, ch. 1) in Himmelfarb (1982). Tocqueville has pointed to the ‘absence of administrative
centralization’ in the United States, as well as American institutions and mores that temper the tyranny of the
majority in the United States. However, Tocqueville's decentralized administration refers to a federal, rather
than unitary, system of government; see Tocqueville (1848). Underlying the principle of checks and balances
is a doubt about the role of ‘enlightened statesmen’. ‘It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be
able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm’; see Madison (1787). This view of human weaknesses contrasts
sharply with more optimistic view of the role of well-intentioned leaders in a collectivist culture.
95 Nevins (1956). Kennedy stresses the importance of US Senators' viewing issues from national
perspectives. His volume includes accounts of American politicians (e.g., Daniel Webster, John Quincy
Adams, Robert Taft) who, in the pursuit of their conviction, risked their political careers by defying the
popular will of their constituencies (Kennedy, 1956). After John Quincy Adams left the White House in
1820, the voters of the Plymouth District asked him to represent them in Congress. He agreed on the
conditions that (1) he would never promote himself as a candidate and (2) he would pursue a course in
Congress independent of the party and his constituents (Kennedy, 1956: 44).40
from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested
interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas’.
6.6. Issues in rule making
While developing countries with collectivist values face a difficult challenge in
establishing political institutions that can tame factionalism, the three examples of political
reform, together with the findings of new institutional economics, suggest several issues
that should be addressed in political reform.
How can political groups be formed to represent societal, not factional, interests? The
Cleisthenes reform institutionally ensured this outcome by dismantling existing tribes and
forming artificial ones. The US Constitution balanced interests of the Union and those of
states by instituting, among other means, a senate where small and large states are
represented with equal votes. It also assured individual rights by adding the Bill of Rights.
Madison drew the attention of the public to the harmful effects of factions (e.g., ‘a landed
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest’) and pointed
out how the new constitution, while unable to remove its causes, would ‘control its
effects’.96 Singapore’s governmental white paper stresses the importance of the national
interests over factional interests. Its electoral reform protected the political rights of the
ethnic minority groups by instituting GRCs.
How can political groups engage in orderly competition? Game theory suggests that
competing political groups will engage in transactions with one another if competition is
viewed as a repeated game, if the performances of the competing groups are well known,
and if the number of groups is small. These conclusions indicate the following conditions:
· Competing political groups (e.g., political parties) and their members not only should
be interested in long-term political payoffs, but also be able to define the future
streams of their respective political payoffs.
· They should have well-defined, enduring policy agenda. Competing political groups
should be associated with these policy agenda. A collectivist culture and a large power
distance can pose as an obstacle for their establishing such agenda. Political groups
may be formed more around leading political figures than around enduring policy
agenda. From an election to another, politicians may reorganize political groups,
change the characteristics of the political groups, and blur their political identities. This
makes it difficult for political competition to be established as a repeated game.
· The number of competing political groups should be limited.
The problem is complex. Political groups play games not only among themselves, but also
with constituents. The dilemma is that sound formal rules (e.g., laws) are required to
achieve these conditions, but cultural collectivism, group rivalry, and discretion are
obstacles to establishing and implementing such rules. The efforts, however, should be on
creating a rudimentary framework for promoting exchanges among competing political
groups. Public choice theory offers some useful suggestions to this end. As Singapore's
electoral reform has demonstrated, the design of an electoral system can influence the
96 Madison (1787).41
nature of political competition. For example, the number of competing political groups
tend to be determined by ‘district magnitude,’ threshold of representation, threshold of
exclusion, and whether the electoral system is based on proportional representation or
majoritarian rule.97
How would political groups agree on the reform of rule implementation? Clearly, rival
political groups will not agree to adopt the system of rule implementation outlined in
Section 6.2 above unless they believe that the system will benefit them, if not now, over
time. Conditions should be created for each competing political group to recognize that the
discounted present value of the future stream of its political payoffs is greater in the new
regime than in all counterfactual regimes, including the status quo. A challenge is to
identify and create these conditions.
How do countries establish a level playing field for political competition? The soundness
of political competition depends on the soundness of not only intergroup competition, but
also intragroup competition. In an individualist culture, a key question in this regard is
campaign financing. In a collectivist culture, this is much more than a campaign financing
issue; a large power distance, and the authority of established politicians, can be an
effective barrier to new politicians' entry into political markets.
7. Learning from game theory to promote efficient economic and political
transactions
7.1 Transactions as nonco-operative games in a society with weak rules
As mentioned in Section 2, economic and political transactions in developing countries
often have elements of a nonco-operative game. They either do not take place or break
down because the three conditions mentioned in Section 2.4 above for successful nonco-
operative games are difficult to establish. When they take place, they do without the
benefit of effective rules enforced by the third party. They take place as a series of one-off
games, rather than as a repeated game, and are inefficient.98 This paper is suggesting that
game theoretic analyses can offer useful insights for promoting economic and political
institutions over time in developing countries.
Standard game theoretic analyses assume, among other conditions, individualism—a
condition that does not exist in many developing countries. Are the results of such analyses
relevant for culturally collectivist developing countries? They definitively are relevant for
97 See Grofman and Reynolds (2000) for a review of the main findings.
98 Transactions often have elements of the game of a prisoners' dilemma. Outside their communities, buyers
and sellers are reluctant to offer credits or employment contracts because they do not consider their relations
will continue, although doing so would pay off to all players in the short run, as well as over time. Employees
often demand unrealistically large increases in wages, and the management responds by work stoppages,
although moderate wage awards and uninterrupted production would benefit both. Political parties often
prefer a status quo rather than agreeing on a reform legislation that would benefit the whole society over
time.42
the games played by economic groups (e.g., among groups of borrowers and lenders,
interest groups, or rival political groups) in developing countries. The games among rival
groups, each comprising culturally collectivist members loyal to one another, mimic the
games among individualistic players. What do game theoretic analyses suggest for
promoting repeated economic and political transactions?
7.2 Promoting co-operative dimensions in nonco-operative games
Axelrod's (1984) suggestions provide a helpful guide for a reforming government.99
Ineffective rules can make a better impact on transactions in this manner. The following
ideas are based on his suggestions.
Make the future count. In Axelrod's words, this is ‘enlarging the shadow of the future’. A
reforming government can take two practical steps: making interactions durable and
making them frequent. The Grameen Bank's microcredit programme has these elements.
Promises of rewards and threats of punishments make productive interactions durable. The
Grameen Bank allows its clients to borrow and pay back a series of small amounts
frequently, rather than one large amount occasionally; this policy allows borrowers and the
Grameen Bank to maintain frequent contacts. When borrowers borrow and pay back a
series of relatively small amounts, with a threat of cutting off the borrowing privilege, the
gains from not paying back each borrowing are small relative to the stream of gains from a
series of future borrowing. Such a lending scheme reduces the possibility of defaults. A
government contemplating a microcredit legislation should ensure that it include these
elements.
Set payoffs appropriately. The penalties for the violators of rules should be sufficiently
large. Many banks impose severe punishments (i.e., cutting off credit lines, demanding an
unusually high interest rate) for delayed loan repayments. The government in many well-
functioning economies imposes credible penalties for the violation of tax laws and other
laws. The government in poor countries often has a tax system that offers real benefits to
late payments.
Make the players’ past records effectively available to all players. Axelrod suggests
improving ‘the ability [of players] to recognize the other players from past interactions,
and to remember the relevant features of those interactions’. More broadly, the government
can disseminate such information. For example, the government can make borrowing
groups' credit histories effectively available to all micro-credit suppliers. The transaction
system focusing on groups, as suggested in this paper, rather than on individuals, would be
less taxing for developing countries with limited administrative resources.
Other suggestions: Axelrod has two other suggestions: teaching reciprocity and altruism to
players. Reciprocity and altruism can be contradictory. Reciprocity means matching other
player's action with a similar action—a strategy that defies altruism when the actions are
hostile. Reciprocity can also lead to a destructive process of economic or political
transactions. To an extent, reciprocal altruism could mean moving away from rationalism
(i.e., moving away from seeking self-interests). However, reciprocal altruism is compatible
99 See Chapter 7, ‘How to Promote Co-operation’.43
with the promotion of the societal interests (rather than factional interest) both Madison
and Lee sought in establishing rules in the United States and Singapore.
8. Summary and conclusions
Economic prosperity in the western developed countries is a result of sustained economic
growth, which has been based in part on their efficient institutions, or rules, encompassing,
among other things, an efficient transaction system, supported by an effective judicial and
political system. Their economic prosperity reflects the efficiency of their rules.
Macroeconomic and microeconomic relations are supported by efficient formal economic
and political rules, which in turn are nested in hospitable values and behavioural norms.
Certain dimensions of culture, such as individualism-collectivism, power distance, and
uncertainty avoidance, affect the efficiency of rules. In particular, individualism is a
critical factor that helps a country establish and maintain rule-based transactions. Cultural
collectivism in most developing countries tend to promote the use of discretion, to
undermine rules, and to cloud the prospects of economic growth.
History provides developing countries with important lessons for promoting growth and
poverty reduction. Before they reach the final stage of institutional development, in which
efficient third-party enforcement supports widespread transactions, developing countries
can benefit from the arrangements that have promoted intercommunity transactions
without strong intercommunity transaction institutions. The experiences of the Community
Responsibility System, the Grameen Bank, and the Korean chaebol system suggest a useful
interim step toward establishing transaction institutions for economic growth, although
these arrangements have critical weaknesses and eventually must be replaced with more
efficient institutions.
In building efficient public institutions in a collectivist culture, it can be useful to make a
clear distinction between rule making and rule implementing and to identify groups of
important rule implementing functions of government. Examples include law enforcement,
tax administration, and budget execution. To promote nondiscretionary rule
implementation, developing countries may consider mandating some organizations only
with these rule implementing roles and making them autonomous from interest groups and
even from elected government officials. Of course, these organizations must be held
accountable to the public on the basis of strict and transparent performance requirements.
They should have well defined, accountable selection and removal procedures for their
officers.
Legislation, policy formulation, and other rule making must be an outcome of a political
process. Political reform in a collectivist culture should be aimed at taming factionalism
and at promoting the interests of the whole society, rather than of factions, sectors, or
regions. Political competition can be considered a game. The assumptions of individualism
and rationalism underlying game theoretic analysis extend realistically to the games among
competing groups in a culturally collectivist society. Therefore, the conclusions of game
theoretic analysis can provide a useful guide for institutional reforms in a collectivist
society. Political reform should be aimed at lowering barriers of entry for political
competitors into political markets. Political reform should be designed to provide a44
framework for competing political groups to play a repeated game as a learning
experience. To this end, the examples of ancient Athens, colonial America, and
contemporary Singapore provide good lessons. If building institutions is a game and a
learning process, it is important to pay attention not only to what institutions to build, but
also how to build them.
The Grameen Bank experiences offer interesting points. The Grameen Bank started to lend
small amounts and gradually increased the amounts as borrowers accumulated their credit
standings. The Grameen Bank and its borrowers played a repeated learning and lending-
borrowing game, while capitalizing on local values. The collective punishment scheme
was consistent with the collectivist culture of the Bangladesh society.
The particular values discussed in this paper are only a part of the systems of values
guiding human behaviour in different societies. The paper has not judged these values.
Rather, it has offered an analysis of economic implications of these values. If values have
these implications, economists, and other social scientists, should integrate these
implications into their analysis of economic growth more explicitly. Rule making should
also take them into account.45
Annex Table 1
Dimensions of Culture and General Human Behavioural Norms
Individualism-Collectivism (IC) Dimension
Collectivist Individualist
Family, school, and work place
Identity of a person Based in the social network Based in the individual
Loyalty to group Strong Weak
Virtues in interpersonal Harmony Speaking one’s mind
relations
Communication High context Low context
Consequences of Shame Guilt
trespassing
Relationship vs. task Relationship over task Task over relationship
Politics and ideas
Prevailing interest Collective Individual
Laws and rights Supposed to differ across groups Supposed to be the same for all
Role of state Dominant Small
Political power Exercised by interest groups Exercised by voters
Governance Rule of man Rule of law
Discretion Rules
Prevailing ideology Equality over individual freedom Individual freedom over equality
Societal goals Harmony and consensus Self-actualization
Power Distance Dimension (PD)
Large PD Small PD
Family, school, and work place
Inequalities among people Are expected and desired Should be minimized
Values Authoritarian Not authoritarian
Preferred organization Centralized Decentralized
Ideal boss Benevolent autocrat Resourceful democrat
Politics and ideas
Privileges Justified for the powerful Not justified for the powerful
Sources of power Ability to use force Ability to give rewards
Family and friends Formal position
Means of reform Changing top people Changing rules
Political spectrum Weak centre and strong wings Strong centre
Prevailing philosophy Hierarchy and stratification Equality
table continues…46
Annex Table 1: continued
Uncertainty Avoidance (UA) Dimension
Strong UA Weak UA
Family, school, work place
Uncertainty Feared Tolerated
Rules Emotional need for rules, even Minimal need for rules
if they do not work
Innovation Resistance to innovation Tolerance of innovation
Politics and ideas
Laws and rules Many and precise Few and general
Citizens’ attitude Negative Positive
toward institutions
Citizens’ protest To be suppressed To be accepted
Civil servants’ attitude Negative Positive
toward political process
Ideology Nationalism Internationalism
Nature of the truth Absolute Relative
Source: Compiled from Hofstede (1997).47
Annex Table 2
Data











Range 6-91 11-104 8-112 2.8-6.8 1.9-5.2 2.3-6.1
Meaning of high
index






Africa 37 63 52 5.1 2.9 3.1
East Africa 27 64 52
West Africa 20 77 54
Mauritius 5.1 2.8 3.9
Zimbabwe 4.7 2.4 2.2
South Africa 65 49 49 5.6 3.5 3.1
Hindu 48 77 40 5.2 2.8 2.6
India 48 77 40 5.2 2.8 2.6
Islamic 23 79 56 4.4 3.7 3.3
Arab countries 38 80 68
Egypt 4.6 3.8 3.4
Malaysia 26 104 36 4.5 4.0 4.3
Pakistan 14 55 70 3.0
Indonesia 14 78 48 3.3 3.2 2.4
Jordan 5.1 3.8 3.4
Latin American 19 71 84 3.7 3.0 2.6
Argentina 46 49 86 3.8 3.3 2.1
Brazil 38 69 76 4.7 2.9 2.3
Uruguay
Mexico 30 81 82 3.8 3.2 2.3
Salvador 19 66 94 3.8 3.7 3.6
Peru 16 64 87 2.8 3.0 3.0
Cost Rica 15 35 86 4.9 2.8 3.0
Colombia 13 67 80 4.1 4.6 2.9
Venezuela 12 81 76 2.8 2.2 2.7
Panama 11 95 86
Ecuador 8 78 67 2.8 1.9 1.8
Guatemala 6 95 101
Bolivia 3.0 2.8 2.3
Orthodox 27 76 88 3.1 3.0 2.2
Yugoslavia 27 76 88
Bulgaria 3.7 3.0 2.4
Ukraine 2.9 2.6 2.1
Russia 2.9 3.5 2.0
Sinic 27 64 54 5.5 4.3 4.7
Japan 46 54 92 5.6 3.2 4.3
Hong Kong, SAR 25 68 29 6.1 5.2 5.2
Singapore 20 74 8 5.8 5.2 6.1
South Korea 18 60 85 4.3 3.5 3.3
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Annex Table 2: continued
Western 70 37 60 6.2 3.7 4.0
USA 91 40 46 6.2 3.6 5.2
Australia 90 36 51 6.7 3.9 4.5
Great Britain 89 35 35 6.4 4.0 5.5
Canada 80 39 48 6.4 3.6 4.6
Netherlands 80 38 53 6.7 3.8 4.8
New Zealand 79 22 49 6.5 4.3 5.4
Italy 76 50 75 4.5 2.3 2.4
Belgium 75 65 94 5.9 3.2 2.4
Denmark 74 16 23 6.6 3.5 4.5
Sweden 71 31 29 6.0 3.6 3.3
France 71 68 86 5.6 3.0 3.5
Ireland 70 28 35 6.3 4.3 4.0
Norway 69 31 50 6.1 3.4 3.5
Switzerland 68 34 58 6.2 4.0 4.9
Germany 67 35 65 6.5 3.1 3.2
Finland 63 33 59 6.6 4.9 5.2
Austria 55 11 70 6.4 3.3 4.2
Israel 54 13 81 6.4 3.3 3.5
Spain 51 57 86 5.8 4.3 4.3
Greece 35 60 112 4.7 3.3 2.6
Luxembourg 6.8 5.2 4.8
Iceland 6.1 4.8 3.9
Slovak Republic 4.1 3.7 2.9
Czech Republic 4.0 3.5 2.9
Sources: Hofstede (1997) and World Economic Forum (2000).49
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